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CAPITAL EXPENDITURES: A RESULT IN SEARCH OF A
RATIONALE

John W. Lee*
Nina R. Murphy**
I.

INTRODUCTION

A business may reduce its gross income by its expenses to arrive
at taxable income;1 however, not all money paid out by a business
during its tax year is deductible in that year. The distinction between business expenses which are deductible under section 1622
and capital expenditures which are not currently deductible under
section 263 3 is probably the most difficult one to discern in the
entire area of business deductions;' principally because so many
disparate elements are encompassed within the capital expenditure
doctrine.
Capital expenditures, defined as amounts paid for new buildings
or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase
the value of property,5 are not currently deductible, a rule
designed primarily to ensure the proper matching of income and
• Partner, Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen, Richmond, Virginia; Lecturer in
Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and Mary; B.A., University of
North Carolina, 1965; LL.B., University of Virginia, 1968; LL.M. (Taxation), Georgetown
University, 1970.
•• Associate Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, The University of Richmond; B.A., Hunter College of CUNY, 1969; J.D., New York University, 1972; LL.M. (Taxation), New York University, 1976.
The authors express their gratitude to-Scott Milburn and .Tohn Walk for their research
assistance.
1. I.R.C. § 162. Citations unless otherwise noted are to the Int. Rev. Code of 1954 as
amended.
2. Id.
3. I.R.C. § 263.
4. See, e.g., Boagni v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 708, 712 (1973).
5. Estate of Meade v. Commissioner, 489 F.2d 161, 164 n.7 (5th Cir. 1974); General Baneshares Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 712, 716 (8th Cir. 1964); Boagni v. Commissioner, 59
T.C. at 711-12. See generally Gunn, The Requirement That a Capital Expenditure Create
or Enhance an Asset, 15 B. C. INDus. & CoM. L. REv. 443, 448-51 (1974) [hereinafter cited
as Gunn].
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expenses. 6 As the Supreme Court has explained, section 263
"serves to prevent a taxpayer from utilizing currently a deduction
properly attributable, through amortization, to later tax years
when the capital asset becomes income producing."7
Accordingly, the issue in most capital expenditure cases is one of
timing. Instead of obtaining a current deduction for the cost under
section 162,8 the taxpayer might be required to amortize or depreciate the cost over the useful life of the acquired or created asset so
that an allocable part of the cost of the asset qualifies as an expense in each year of its business use. 9 Timing is important because immediate reduction in tax liability given by a current deduction is of greater value than a deferred deduction. 1° Cases
involving the timing issue generally define a capital expenditure as
one which creates or enhances a capital asset. 11
The capital expenditure doctrine encompasses not only the timing of the deduction, but also considers the character and amount
of income or loss realized in a transaction. This aspect of the doctrine attempts to prevent a double tax benefit: a capital gains deduction against an unreduced gain coupled with an ordinary deduction for the expenditure.12 The clearest example of this element
of the doctrine is the tax treatment of the costs of selling a capital
asset. Such costs cannot generate an ordinary business expense deduction; rather they must be treated as a capital expenditure, either increasing basis or offsetting the sale proceeds, and thereby
reducing the gain from the sale of the asset. 13 The rationale for this
rule is that "all expenses which stem from a capital transaction
should be 'matched', or equated, with all gains from the same capi6. Sharples v. United States, 533 F.2d 550, 555 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
7. Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16 (1974).
8. I.R.C. § 162. Section 212 might also permit a current deduction for any expenses connected with the production of income. I.R.C. § 212.
9. I.R.C. § 167.
10. "This deferral is the equivalent of an interest-free loan from the government, the economic benefits of which can be very significant." STAFF OF THE JOINT CoMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, TAX SHELTERS 6 (1976).
11. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974).
12. Sharples v. United States, 533 F.2d at 555; see Towanda Textiles, Inc. v. United
States, 180 F. Supp. 373 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
13. Spreckels v. Commissioner, 315 U.S. 626 (1942); accord, Ward v. Commissioner, 224
F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1955).
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tal transaction and the expenses should receive identical tax treatment as the gains."~" This element of capital expenditures is alternatively described as the "origin-of-the-claim" doctrine15 or the
"tax benefit rule. " 16
The capital expenditure doctrine also extends to the tax treatment of the costs of organizing or reorganizing a corporation or a
partnership. Courts frequently explain the required capitalization
of these costs by viewing the formal structure of an entity as an
intangible capital asset under the theory that a capital asset has
been created.17 Mandatory capitalization in these cases can be better explained by the tax benefit rule. 18
The principle that expenses should be matched against income,
i.e., the clear reflection of income principle, sometimes allows the
current deduction of an ostensibly capital expenditure.19 Some of
the repair-improvement cases as well as the minimum expense rule
illustrate this principle.20
IJ.

CREATION OR ENHANCEMENT OF AN AssET

Early cases frequently required capitalization whenever the benefits of the expenditure lasted longer than the taxpayer's yearly
accounting period;21 consequently, the classic definition of capital
expenditure is a cost securing an advantage to the taxpayer which
has a life of more than one year.22 Conversely, where a necessary
14. Sharples v. United States, 533 F.2d at 555.
15. ld.; accord, Kimbell v. United States, 490 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1974).
16. Brown v. Commissioner, 529 F.2d 609 (loth Cir. 1976); Dynamics Corp. of America v.
United States, 449 F.2d 402, 412 (Ct. CI. 1971). See generally Gunn, supra note 5, at 449
n.29.
17. See, e.g., General Bancshares Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 712, 715 (8th Cir.
1964).
18. See text accompanying notes 141-83 infra. See generally Gunn, supra note 5, at 449
n.29.
19. See Cincinnati, N. 0. & Tex. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563, 572-73 (Ct.
CI. 1970); Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515 (1976).
20. See text accompanying notes 275-362 infra. See also Gunn, supra note 5, at 457-61.
21. W. B. Harbeson Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 542, 550 (1931); Georgia Car
& Locomotive Co. v. Commissioner, 2 B.T.A. 986, 990 (1925); Strauss Market, Inc. v. Commissioner, 2 B.T.A. 1264 (1925). See generally Note, Income Tax Accounting: Business Expense or Capital Outlay, 47 HARv. L. REv. 669 (1934).
22. United States v. Akin, 248 F.2d 742, 744 (loth Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 956
(1958); accord, Fall River Gas Appliance Co. v. Commissioner, 349 F.2d 515 (1st Cir. 1965).
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business expenditure might otherwise be considered capital, a deduction has been allowed where the useful life of the property was
less than one year. 23 More recently, however, the courts have analyzed the one-year rule of thumb as "intended to serve as a mere
guidepost for the resolution of the ultimate issue, not as an absolute rule requiring the automatic capitalization of every expenditure providing the taxpayer with a benefit enduring for a period in
excess of one year. " 24
The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan
Association, 211 held that "the presence of an ensuing benefit that
may have some future aspect is not controlling [as to whether an
expenditure is capital or an ordinary business expense]: many expenses concededly deductible have prospective effect beyond the
taxable year."28 The Supreme Court enunciated the capital expenditure test as whether the payment served to create or enhance for
the taxpayer "what is essentially a separate and distinct additional
asset. " 27 Such a payment is regarded as capital in nature and not
even an expense, let alone an ordinary expense that would generally be deductible under section 162(a). Some subsequent decisions, notably that of the Second Circuit in Briarcliff Candy Corp.
23. Helvering v. Kansas City Am. Ass'n Baseball, 75 F.2d 600, 604 (8th Cir. 1935); Morris
Nachman v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 1204, 1207 n.l (1949), aff'd, 191 F.2d 934 (1951); J.E.
Mergott Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 47, 50 (1948); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 1074, 1078 (1933), aff'd, 72 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1934); W. B. Harbeson Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. at 550. See Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (1958).
24. United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 689 (lOth Cir. 1968); accord, Sears Oil Co. v.
Commissioner, 359 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1966).
25. 403 u.s. 345.
26. Id. at 354.
27. Id. In Lincoln Savings & Loan, the taxpayer was required to pay an "additional premium" to the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) by the National
Housing Act § 404(d). This payment was to be made into a "Secondary Reserve" which was,
in the words of the court, "available only for stated and circumscribed purposes." Id. at 355.
The Commissioner allowed the taxpayer to deduct the premium paid into the "Primary
Reserve" but disallowed it as to the § 404(d) payment. The Commissioner was upheld in the
Tax Court, 51 T.C. 82 (1968), but the Ninth Circuit reversed, 422 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1970).
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit stating:
What is important and controlling, we feel, is that the § 404(d) payment serves to
create or enhance for Lincoln what is essentially a separate and distinct additional
asset and that, as an inevitable consequence, the payment is capital in nature and not
an expense, let alone an ordinary expense. . . .
403 U.S. at 354.
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v. Commissioner, 28 have read Lincoln Savings & Loan as effectuating a radical shift in emphasis: directing the inquiry away from
whether the benefit of the expenditure extended beyond the yearly
tax accounting period, rather focusing upon' whether it created or
enhanced an essehtially separate and distinct additional asset. 29
Moreover, the one-year rule of thumb had already been severely
eroded. In Van Iderstine Co. v. Commissioner, 80 the Second Circuit had previously held that even expenditures of possible economic value beyond the tax year were currently deductible so long
as they did not create distinct property rights: "a 'capital expenditure' ... [must result] in the acquisition of 'capital,' i.e., an addition to the payer's taxable wealth."31 Other circuit courts followed
the Lincoln Savings & Loan approach, allowing a current deduction for expenditures that generated future economic benefits if
they did not result in the acquisition of, or improvement to, a distinct and recognizable property interest. For example, the Tenth
Circuit, which had earlier adopted the one-year rule,32 held in Colorado Springs National Bank v. United States 88 that start-up ex28. 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
29. Id. at 782. Briarcliff involved a retail candy company which sought to deduct the
expenses of creating a wholesale "franchise division" by selling to "sales agents" such as
drug stores. The Tax Court held against the taxpayer solely because the benefit of the
franchise contracts would extend beyond the tax year. 31 T.C.M. 171 (1972). The circuit
court reversed, applying the Lincoln Savings & Loan additional asset test and sta~ing that
"[t)he meagerness of [the taxpayer's) rights under these contracts made them only marginally enforceable." 475 F.2d at 786 n.5. But see Florida Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 64
T.C. 269, 272 (1975), aff'd in unpub. opinion, (5th Cir. Apr. 26, 1977) where the Tax Court
stated, "Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Ass'n . • • did not redefine or otherwise
alter the previously discussed, well-settled rules for determining whether an expenditure
must be deducted or capitali2ed." 64 T.C. at 282. The Tax Court, in so holding, relied upon
United States v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 405 U.S. 298 (1972), in which the taxpayer was
required to buy stock in the farm credit system in proportion to interest on its loans. The
stock was totally unmarketable because it paid no dividends, it was not freely transferable,
and ownership bore no relation to voting power. The taxpayer sought to deduct the cost of
the stock as interest expense. In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court stated, "Since
the security is of value in more than one taxable year, it is a capital asset within the meaning of § 1221 of the Internal Revenue Code, and its cost is nondeductible." 405 U.S. at 310.
Although written one year after Lincoln Savings & Loan, the Court cited but did not discuss that case.
30. 261 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1958).
31. Id. at 213.
32. See Hotel Kingkade v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 310, 312 (lOth Cir. 1950).
33. 505 F.2d 1185 (lOth Cir. 1974). Colorado Springs National Bank sought to deduct
costs incurred by participating in a then new charge card system, Master Charge. The start-
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p~nditures

enabling the taxpayer to modify an existing business
are currently deductible.
'

The start-up expenditures here challenged did not create a property
interest. They produced nothing corporeal or salable. They are recurring. At the most they introduced a more efficient method of conducting an old business. The government suggests no way in which
they could be amortized. The government's theoretical approach ignores the practicalities of the situation, and permits a distortion of
taxpayer's financial situation. H an expenditure, concededly of temporal value, may be neither expensed nor amortized, the adoption of
technological advances is discouraged. 34

More recent cases in the Fourth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits have
clarified the Lincoln Savings & Loan standard and its relation to
the one-year rule. In First National Bank of South Carolina v.
United States, 315 th~ Fourth Circuit adopted the reasoning of the
Tenth Circuit in Colorado Springs, noting that the two cases were
"indistinguishable."36 Later, in Jack's Cookie Co. v. Commissioner, 37 the Fourth Circuit explained its view. In this case, the
taxpayer claimed a business expense deduction for amounts paid
under a lease on a building financed by industrial revenue bonds.
The Internal Revenue Service disallowed the deduction as to the
amounts allocated to a mandatory reserve because this fund was
not used to satisfy bond obligations during the tax year. The taxpayer argued that the reserve amounts were rent in effect, since
the reserve was required by the terms of its lease. Furthermore,
up costs included computer costs, credit checks, and promotional activities. The government
argued that these were preoperation expenses of entering a new business and should therefore be capitalized. Although the trial court found as a fact that Master Charge was a "new
type of business ... not just an extension of the lending field," the court held for the bank.
Id. at 1189. The government appealed the adverse result based on that inconsistency, but
the Tenth Circuit affirmed, relying on Lincoln Savings & Loan and Briarcliff.
34. 505 F.2d at 1192. The Tax Court, as well, adopted this approach. First Security Bank
of Idaho, N.A. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 644, 650-51 (1975), aff'd, 592 F.2d 1050, 1052 (9th
Cir. 1979); Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 872 (1977), aff'd, 592 F.2d
433 (8th Cir. 1979); accord, First Nat'l Bank of South Carolina v. United States, 558 F.2d
721 (4th Cir. 1977) per curiam; Jack's Cookie Co. v. Commissioner, 597 F.2d 395 (4th Cir.
1979).
35. 558 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1977).
36. I d. at 723.
37. 597 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1979).
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relying on First National Bank, the taxpayer argued that the mere
fact of the reserve's future economic benefit did not require its
capitalization. The court held against the taxpayer, stating, "In our
opinion, First [National] Bank did not abrogate the rule followed
in our prior decisions, but merely refined and made explicit certain
limitations which have always been inherent in its application."88
The court further explained:
[U]nless an expenditure which would otherwise be treated as a section 162(a) business expense results in benefits which are not realized and exhausted within the taxable year, its capitalization would
be inappropriate in any event. . . . The one-year rule is useful because it serves to segregate from all business costs those which cannot possibly be considered capital in nature because of their transitory utility to the taxpayer. The rule, however, cannot be applied
inexorably in the other direction. . . .
It is apparent that the "separate assets" test of Lincoln Savings
[&Loan] •.. necessarily incorporates the one-year rule and that in
order to warrant capitalization of an expense, one integral characteristic of the "separate and distinct asset" which is "created or enhanced" by the outlay, is that it will serve the taxpayer in subsequent years. 39

Similarly, in Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Commissioner, 40
the Tax Court stated:
Generally, expenditures to acquire assets or secure benefits which
last beyond the taxable year must be capitalized. Nevertheless, the
mere presence of some possible future benefit from an expenditure
is not controlling where such payment was made to promote the taxpayer's existing business and does not create or enhance a separate
and distinct asset or property interest."1

On appeal, the Eighth Circuit cited Colorado Springs and Lincoln
Savings & Loan in affirming the decision as well as the analysis of
38. Id. at 403.
39. Id. at 405.
40. 68 T.C. 872 (1977).
41. I d. at 878-89 (citing Lincoln Savings & Loan, Mississippi Chem. Corp., Florida Publishing Co., Briarcliff Candy, Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, and First Security Bank of
Idaho, N.A.).
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the Tax Court. 42 In First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. Commissioner, 43 the Ninth Circuit was faced with a similar fact situation
and "adopted'' Colorado Springs as the law of the Ninth Circuit,
citing First National Bank and Iowa-Des Moines Bank with explicit approval."" The court noted that "nothing in Lincoln Savings
& Loan ... is contrary to these decisions."45 Perhaps the most
concise formulation of the synthesis of Lincoln Savings & Loan
and the one-year rule is Judge Wiles' opinion for the Tax Court in
Nagy v. Commissioner:46 "The controlling issue is whether the expenditure serves to create or enhance a separate and distinct asset
which lasts beyond the end of the taxable year."47
Accordingly, the test under this aspect of the capital expenditure
doctrine has two elements, viz., whether the expenditure creates or
enhances a separate asset and whether this asset benefits the taxpayer in future years. The acquisition of a separate capital asset
can be seen clearly where the taxpayer purchases a new business.48
Moreover, payment of obligations assumed in connection with a
purchase of an existing business, which might otherwise be deductible, are capital expenditures if an integral part of the acquisition.49 Under this analysis, shareholders who acquired corporate
assets in a liquidation and then made pension payments to employees of the dissolved corporation were required to treat the payments as part of their acquisition costs for the assets. 5° Likewise,
royalties paid by a taxpayer in settlement of a claim against its
predecessor whose assets it acquired had to be capitalized. 5 1 As the
42. 592 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1979). The case involved the costs of instituting a bank credit
card system similar to that involved in Colorado Springs.
43. 592 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'g 63 T.C. 644 (1975).
44. 592 F.2d at 1052.
45. Id.
46. 37 T.C.M. 1326 (1978).
47. Id. at 1328.
48. See, e.g., Vermont Transit Co. v. Commissioner, 218 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 945 (1955); Sevr;mes v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 837 (W.D. Ky. 1962);
Hudgins v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 534, 538 (1970).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 418 F.2d 589, 596 (5th Cir. 1969); W. D. Haden Co.
v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 588, 591 (5th Cir. 1948); Holdcroft Transp. Co. v. Commissioner,
153 F.2d 323, 324 (8th Cir. 1946); Caldwell & Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 790, 793
(1932).
50. Rev. Rul. 59-228, 1959-2 C.B. 59.
51. Watab Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 27 B.T.A. 488, 505-06 (1932).
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Tax Court pointed out in M. Buten & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 an expenditure accrued by a former owner but paid by
the new owner constitutes a part of his cost of acquisition regardless of what would have been the tax character of the expenditure
as to the former owner. The cost of installing or acquiring distinct
assets used in the taxpayer's business just as clearly is encompassed within the "acquisition of capital asset" rule.113 Of course,
acquisition also includes self-construction of capital assets, such as
buildings and driveways.u Premiums or overtime paid or incurred
solely to expedite capital construction also must be capitalized.1111
Several significant decisions have allowed a current deduction
for expenditures that would produce benefits in future tax years
but that did not enhance or create a separate and distinct additional asset. In Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 116 the taxpayer incurred substantial costs in developing suburban markets
for its products by contracting with local proprietors to display its
goods. The Second Circuit described these expenditures as intangible contributions to intangible assets - advertising designed to increase distribution - and ruled that they were currently deductible. Not dissimilarly, in Colorado Springs National Bank v.
United States, 117 the Tenth Circuit held that start-up costs (con52. 31 T.C.M. 178, 181 (1972).
53. Biggs v. Commissioner, 27 T.C.M. 1177 (1968), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1971) (typewriter capital expenditure); Pessin v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 590, 597 (1965) (purchase of
colt); Southern Ford Tractor Corp. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 833 (1958) (purchase of sprinkler system); Rev. Rul. 70-26, 1970-1 C.B. 55 (purchase of title files).
54. Jones v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1100 (1956), rev'd on other grounds, 259 F.2d 300 (5th
Cir. 1958) (construction of concrete driveway); Boardman Coal Mining Co. v. Commissioner,
18 B.T.A. 160 (1929) (purchase of miners' houses and mining equipment). See Coors v.
Commissioner, 60 T.C. 368 (1973) (internal construction of production facilities), acq. 1974 2 C.B. 2.
55. W. B. Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 1192, 1199-1200 (1932);
Buedingen v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 335, 338 (1927); Rev. Rul. 70-332, 1970-1 C.B. 31. The
early Third Circuit cases were erroneous in allowing a current deduction for the cost of
expediting construction, either as a one-shot reasonable depreciation charge, as in Atwater
Kent Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 331, 333 (3rd Cir. 1930), or as a necessary business
expense, as in Frank & Seder Co. v. Commissioner, 44 F.2d 147, 149 (3rd Cir. 1930). Clearly,
an expedition premium constitutes a cost of acquisition, hence a capital expenditure under
§ 263, W. B. Brown & Sons Lumber Co., 26 B.T.A. at 1192, and must be depreciated over
the useful life of the asset acquired, Sears Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 359 F.2d at 197-98.
56. 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973).
57. 505 F.2d 1185 (lOth Cir. 1974).
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sisting of computer costs, credit checks, and promotional activities)
for a new Master Charge program were currently deductible even
though they generated future economic benefits. The court concluded that these start-up expenditures did not create a separate
property interest. The Tax Court has followed Colorado Springs
National Bank, but has indicated that start-up costs must be capitalized when incurred in a new venture unrelated to the existing
business of the taxpayer.68 Moreover, the Tax Court has applied a
consistently narrow definition of an existing business. 69 Furthermore, the Tax Court has held both Briarcliff and Lincoln Savings
& Loan inapplicable when the challenged expenditure relates to a
tangible asset, such as preliminary plans f9r an office-showroom
complex60 or the acquisition of another newspaper by a publishing
company.61
The Tax Court has treated as acquisition costs expenditures that
only awkwardly fit the mold, e.g., cleaning expenses paid to prepare a shopping center for its grand opening as well as insurance
premiums paid for fire and extended coverage on buildings in the
center during the construction;62 such payments hardly seem to
have created or enhanced the shopping center.63 Similarly in
George L. Schultz, 64 the Tax Court treated insurance costs, storage
charges, and estimated ad valorem taxes paid during the four year
aging period for whiskey purchased as an investment as part of the
sales price of acquisition of four year old whiskey.
Such expenditures clearly do not enhance a capital asset; and it
is difficult to regard them simply as a cost of acquisition. Perhaps
if these types of expenditures were always reflected in the purchase
price of the completed asset, whether a turnkey shopping center or
58. First Security Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 644, 649 n.16 (1975),
aff'd, 592 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1979). I.R.C. § 195, added by § 102(a), Pub. L. 96-605 (1980),
allows five-year amortization of start-up costs.
59. York v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 520 (1957), rev'd, 261 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1958); accord
O'Donnell v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 781 (1974), aff'd in unpub. op. (7th Cir. July 23, 1975).
60. Cagle v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 86, 97 (1974), aff'd, 539 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976).
61. Florida Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 269, 281 (1975), aff'd in unpub. op.,
(5th Cir. Apr. 26, 1977).
62. Shainberg v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 241 (1959).
63. See Cagle v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. at 96-97 (analyzing Shainberg as involving an
expenditure made in connection with the acquisition of a capital asset).
64. 50 T.C. 688, 696 (1968).
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four year old whiskey, they could be viewed as acquisition costs in
order to place the taxpayer who self-constructs such assets on a
par with the taxpayer who purchases them. 65 Commentators have
suggested that the rationale, if any, for these decisions must be
found in the clear reflection of income aspect of the capital expenditure doctrine discussed below.66
Other cases involving expenditures that usually constitute ordinary and necessary business expenses fit more readily into the
mold of acquisition of a capital asset. For example in Stevens v.
Commissioner, 67 the taxpayer, the operator of a stable, obtained a
one-half interest in certain race horses under an arrangement in
which his joint venturer paid the purchase price of horses selected
by taxpayer and thereafter the taxpayer paid all the training and
maintenance costs of such horses. One-half of the cost of the upkeep was deductible by the joint venturer; the other half, however,
was considered the taxpayer's portion of the purchase price and
req\lired to be capitalized. Other cases - which are difficult to fit
into the traditional repair-improvement dichotomy68 - may be
better explained, on the basis that the expenditures constitute part
of the purchase price of a capital asset. For example, in Mt. Morris
Drive-In Theater Co. v. Commissioner, 69 the taxpayer purchased
land which it had intended to use for a drive-in theater, knowing
that when the theater was constructed without a proper drainage
system, the water flow would cause excess run-off onto adjacent
property. The adjoining landowners sued the taxpayer for erosion
damages due to the run-off; the suit was settled by providing for
construction of a drainage system to carry the water to a public
drain. The majority opinion in the Tax Court required capitalization of the costs of the drainage system, reasoning that had such
costs been included in the original construction plans, they would
have been capital in nature. At the time the drive-in theater was
65. See Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974).
66. Gunn, supra note 5. See notes 177-93, 347-62 infra and accompanying text.
67. 388 F.2d 298 (6th Cir. 1968).
68. See notes 275-362 infra and accompanying text. One line of cases would allow a deduction for seemingly capital expenditures that restore a busines asset to its usual operating
efficiency, particularly where a casualty-like event has destroyed its effectiveness. See Mt.
Morris Drive-In Theatre Co. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 272 (1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 85 (5th
Cir. 1956).
69. ld.
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constructed, it was obvious that a proper drainage system would be
required and "until this was accomplished, [the taxpayer's] capital
investment was incomplete. " 70
III.

ORIGIN-OF-THE-CLAIM DocTRINE

The tax benefit or origin-of-the-claim aspect of the capital expenditure doctrine differs from the acquisition or enhancement of
a capital asset aspect in that the basis for requiring capitalization
is the integral relationship between the expenditure and a capital
asset, albeit not a cost of acquiring or improving the asset. To allow a current deduction for such an expenditure while taxing related gain from the capital asset as capital gain, unreduced for the
expenditure, would distort the taxpayer's income through a double
deduction, or at least a deduction and a half (an ordinary deduction for the expenditure and a capital gain deduction on the gain
under section 1202).71 Widely applied tax rules- e.g., the requirement of offsetting gains (or increasing losses) from sales of capital
assets by the costs of sale, capitalization of expenditures under the
•
origin-of-the-claim test, the tax benefit rule of Arrowsmith
v. Com73
missioner72 and United States v. Skelly Oil Company, and even
the classic tax benefit doctrine7" - all rest, at least in part, upon
this same conceptual footing. Expenditures which are integrally related to an income or loss item or transaction must possess the
same character for tax purposes as that item or transaction in order to prevent a distortion of the taxpayer's income.
Treasury Regulation section 1.263(a)-2(e) provides that commissions paid in selling securities constitute an offset against the selling price, except as to securities dealers, who may treat them as
ordinary and necessary business expenses. Similar treatment is accorded to commissions paid by the seller in real estate sales715 and
to attorney and appraiser fees incurred in obtaining remuneration
70. Id. at 275.
71. I.R.C. § 1202. Currently, the capital gain deduction allowed is 60% of the total gain.
72. 344 u.s. 6 (1952).
73. 394 u.s. 678 (1969).
74. The classic tax benefit doctrine deals with recovery of previously deducted items.
75. See, e.g., Hunt v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 829, 839 (1942); Cavanaugh v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 1251 (1930); Griffin v. Commissioner, 19 B.T.A. 1243 (1930).
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for a condemnation of the taxpayer's property.76 This offset to
sales proceeds rule cannot be brought within the traditional definition of a capital expenditure as creating or enhancing a capital asset, except perhaps under the fiction that such commissions serve
to increase the sale price of the property and hence constitute capital expenditures.77 In many cases the seller is not engaged in a
trade or business, particularly where securities are involved, so
that the expenses could not be business deductions in any event;78
but it requires considerable mental gymnastics to exclude such expenses from the penumbra of section 21279 on grounds other than
that they are not ordinary. 8 ° Costs of sale must be applied as an
offset not because they serve to increase the selling price, but because a distortion in income would result if non-dealers were allowed to treat the expenditures as ordinary deductions while taking into account only forty percent81 of the related gain.82 The
76. See, e.g., Isaac G. Johnson & Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1945); Williams v. Burnet, 59 F.2d 357 (D.C. Cir. 1932). But see Madden v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.
513, 518 (1972), rev'd, 514 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 912 (1976), where
the Tax Court held that legal fees expended by the taxpayer in unsuccessfully attempting to
limit condemnation of their commercial orchard property were deductible under § 162(a).
The Tax Court later repudiated its Madden analysis in Soelling v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.
1052 (1978) where it stated:
In Madden the Ninth Circuit clarified the law in this area basing its opinion on those
of the Supreme Court in Woodward v. Commissioner ..• and United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963). The cumulative result of these opinions places a difficult
burden on the taxpayer to prove that a Section 212 expense is ordinary and necessary
rather than capital in nature when incurred in connection with an investment, be it
an acquisition or a disposition thereof. The facts and circumstances herein are indistinguishable from those in Madden. However, in our decision in Madden we applied
the primary purpose test, rejected by Woodward and the Ninth Circuit in their reversal of Madden, rather than the origin and character test herein employed. We will,
therefore, no longer follow our decision in that case. . . •
70 T.C. at 1055-56. The primary purpose test and the origin of claim test are discussed
infra.
77. See Ward v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d 547, 555 (9th Cir. 1955).
78. See Spreckels v. Commissioner, 315 U.S. 626 (1942).
79. I.R.C. § 212 allows a deduction for expenses incurred in the production of income
with no requirement that the taxpayer be engaged in a trade or business.
80. For an attempt to do so, see Ward v. Commissioner, 224 F.2d at 555. Focusing primarily on the production of (capital gain) income aspect of § 212, one commentator has concluded that most expenses of sale authorities are incorrect. See Teschner, Expense of Sale:
Law-Making by the Commissioner, 35 TAXEs 574 (1957).
81. For purposes of illustration, it is assumed throughout this section (unless otherwise
specifically stated) that the taxpayer is an individual and that the alternative capital gains
tax of I.R.C. § 1201 does not apply.
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proper rationale is that " [e]xpenses necessarily incurred to realize
a capital gain reduce the amount of that gain and partake of the
nature of the gain to which they relate."83
The origin-of-the-claim doctrine developed comparatively late.
Prior to Woodward v. Commissioners• and United States v. Hilton
Hotels Corp., 85 courts had applied two conflicting tests to determine whether legal expenses should be treated as a current business expense or a capital or personal expenditure: the primary-purpose test86 and the origin-of-the-claim test.87 The primary purpose
test has been stated in the context of litigation expenses as follows:
[I]f the primary or sole purpose of the suit is to perfect or defend
title, the expenditures are not deductible. . . . On the other hand,
even though title may be involved, if its defense or perfection is not
the primary purpose of the litigation, the expenditures do not encounter the barrier of the regulation's standard and they may qualify instead as ordinary and necessary expenses.88

The explicit genesis of the origin-of-the-claim test lies in United
States v. Gilmore, 89 where the Supreme Court resolved the ques82. See Spreckels v. Commissioner, 315 U.S. 626, 630 n.ll {1942); Petit v. Commissioner,
8 T.C. 228, 237 {1947). .
83. Towanda Textiles, Inc. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 373, 378 {Ct. Cl. 1960). The
Court of Claims, in basing this analysis on Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 {1952),
appears to have been the first court to recognize the relationship between the cost of sale
offset rule and the Arrowsmith tax benefit doctrine.
84. 397 u.s. 572 {1970).
85. 397 U.S. 580 {1970). Both Woodward and Hilton Hotels involved legal fees incurred
during stockholder appraisal litigation.
86. See, e.g., Industrial Aggregate Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d 639 {8th Cir. 1960);
Lewis v. Commissioner, 253 F.2d 821, 827 {2d Cir. 1958); Rassenfoss v. Commissioner, 158
F.2d 764 {7th Cir. 1946); Galewitz v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 104 {1968), rev'd, 411 F.2d 1374
{2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 906 {1969).
87. See, e.g., Estate of Morgan v. Commissioner, 332 F.2d 144, 151 {5th Cir. 1964); Spangler v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 913, 918 {9th Cir. 1963); Mitchell v. United States, 408 F.2d
435, 441 {Ct. Cl. 1969).
88. Industrial Aggregate Co. v. United States, 284 F.2d at 645. The regulation referred to
by the court is Treas. Reg. § 1.263{a)-2{c) which states that "[t]he cost of defending or
perfecting title to property" is a capital expenditure.
89. 372 U.S. 39 {1963). In Gilmore, the taxpayer sought to deduct legal expenses incurred
in defending a divorce suit on the grounds that the suit was necessary to protect income
producing property from the claims of his wife. The court concluded that to decide for the
taxpayer would lead to "capricious results," i.e., deductibility would depend on whether a
judgment stood to be satisfied out of income or non-income producing assets. I d. at 48. In so
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tion of deductibility of business versus personal litigation costs by
turning to the "origin and character of the claim with respect to
which an expense was incurred, rather than its potential consequences upon the fortunes of the taxpayer."00 Thereafter, courts
were divided as to the proper scope and application of the Gilmore
test. 91 The Supreme Court resolved this conflict in Woodward v.
Commissioner92 to determine whether expenses paid in connection
with appraisal litigation arising from a redemption of stock were
capital expenditures incurred in the acquisition of a capital asset.
The Supreme Court explicitly rejected the primary-purpose test:
We agree with the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals that the
"primary purpose" test has no application here. That uncertain and
difficult test may be the best that can be devised to determine the
tax treatment of costs incurred in litigation that may affect a taxpayer's title to property more or less indirectly, and that thus calls
for a judgment whether the taxpayer can fairly be said to be "defending or perfecting title." Such uncertainty is not called for in applying the regulation that makes the "cost of acquisition" of a capital asset a capital expense. In our view application of the latter
regulation to litigation expenses involves the simpler inquiry
whether the origin of the claim litigated is in the process of acquisideciding, the Court relied upon Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952). There, the
Court held improper a deduction of legal expenses incurred in contesting a gift tax assessment. The taxpayer had based his claim on the fact that payment of the tax would necessitate liquidation of income producing securities. The Supreme Court refused to consider the
consequences of litigation and in effect looked to the origin of the claim. See Reed v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 32, 39 n.10 (1970).
90. 372 U.S. at 49.
91. See, e.g., Moore Trust v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 430 (1970), where the Tax Court
decided that legal expenses incurred by the trustee were not capital expenditures, based
solely on the primary purpose test. Judge Tannenwald noted in a concurring opinion:
I think the use of a "primary purpose" test in cases of this type is inappropriate,
because it implies that the subjective intent of the parties ought to be taken into
account. I believe that, in the area of litigation expenses, it is "the origin and character of the claim with respect to which [the] expense was incurred" which controls. See
United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 49 (1963). The rationale which underpins this
mandate of the Supreme Court is equally applicable in determining whether an expenditure is a nondeductible capital item or a deductible expense within the purview
of section 212 and in determining whether the expenditure is a nondeductible personal item or a section 212 deduction.
49 T.C. at 443.
92. 397 U.S. 572 (1970); accord, United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580 (1970).
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tion itself.98

The origin-of-the-claim test was also immediately applied by
several circuit courts to the cost of disposition of a capital asset
although Woodward and its companion case, United States v.
Hilton Hotels Corp., 94 involved only the cost of acquisition of a
capital asset.95 The Supreme Court itself had telegraphed this result in Woodward:
It has long been recognized, as a general matter, that costs incurred in the acquisition or disposition of a capital asset are to be
treated as capital expenditures. The most familiar example of such
treatment is the capitalization of brokerage fees for the sale or
purchase of securities, as explicitly provided by a long standing
Treasury regulation. . . .
The law could hardly be otherwise, for such ancillary expenses incurred in acquiring or disposing of an asset are as much part of the
cost of that asset as is the price paid for it.98

It appears clear, therefore, that the basis for the capitalization of
costs incurred in the disposition of a capital asset, including commissions, is the origin-of-the-claim test.97

The rationale of the origin-of-the-claim test is that all expenses
which stem from a capital transaction should be "matched" or
93. 397 u.s. 572, 577.
94. 397 u.s. 580.
95. See Helgerson v. United States, 426 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1970); accord, Estate of Baier
v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 1976); Third National Bank of Nashville v.
United States, 427 F.2d 343 (6th Cir. 1970); Great Lakes Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 352
F. Supp. 1159, 1172 (W.D. Mo. 1972), alf'd in unpub. order, (8th Cir. May 23, 1974).
96. 397 U.S. at 575-76 (emphasis added). The regulation referred to by the Court, Treas.
Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(e), states that "[c]ommissions paid in purchasing securities" are capital
expenditures, and that "[c]ommissions paid in selling securities are an offset against the
selling· price, except that in the case of dealers in securities such commissions may be
treated as an ordinary and necessary business expense." Accord, Third National Bank in
Nashville v. United States, 427 F.2d 343, 344 (6th Cir. 1970) ("[w]hile we recognize that in
the instant case the taxpayers are sellers of stock rather than purchasers, as is true in the
Woodward and Hilton Hotel cases, we believe the Supreme Court clearly intended its ruling
to apply to both. The words 'or disposition' indicate this, as does the use of the 'familiar
example' of 'the capitalization of brokerage fees for the sale of purchase of securities' ").
97. See Estate of Meade v. Commissioner, 489 F.2d 161, 164 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 882, reh. denied, 419 U.S. 1060 (1974).
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equated with all gains from the same capital transaction and that
such expenses and related gains should receive identical tax treatment.98 AI:. the Court of Claims pointed out in Munn v. United
States, 99 when an expense is incurred in the process of acquisition
or disposition of a capital asset, the primary purpose test does not
apply. "If such a connection exists, the expenses simply take the
character of the asset to which they relate."100 This approach severely erodes the prior distinction under section 212101 between expenses incident to the disposition of property and those incident to
collection of the proceeds of the sale.102
While the related transaction theory appears the primary premise of the origin-of-the-claim test, the Supreme Court in both Gilmore and Woodward appears to have relied in part on a need to
avoid "capricious results"; in Gilmore, the Court so stated. 103 For
example, should each of two taxpayers be sued for an automobile
accident while driving for pleasure, deductibility of the litigation
costs would turn on the mere circumstance of the character of the
assets each would happen to possess. Under the rejected "consequences" test, the court would look to "whether the judgments
98. Sharples v. United States, 533 F.2d 550, 555 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
99. 455 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
100. Id. at 1033.
101. I.R.C. § 212.
102. 455 F.2d at 1033. The court explained,
It is clear to us that the expenses were incurred as a direct result of the sale of capital
assets and were prompted out of a desire to collect the proceeds of that sale. We,
therefore, feel the best approach to take in this case is to follow not only the Woodward and Hilton Hotels cases, but also to recognize the wisdom of the proposition
that the distinction between expenses incident to a disposition of property and those
incident to collection of the proceeds of the sale is a tenuous distinction in all
respects.
Id. But see Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604 (Ct. Cl. 1978) where the
court allowed deduction of litigation expenses incurred in connection with a suit for royalty
payments because title was not in dispute. See also Helgerson v. United States, 426 F.2d
1293, 1298 (8th Cir. 1970), stating,
The strict distinction drawn in Naylor [v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 346 (5th Cir.
1953)] between expenses incident to disposition of property and expenses incident to
collection of the proceeds of the sale, the former accorded a capital and the latter a
deductible nonbusiness expense status is tenous in light of Woodward and Hilton
Hotels, and consequently we decline to observe it here.
Id. The court opted instead for an "expansive application, rather than a narrow circumscription, of the phrase 'incurred in the ••• disposition of a capital asset.'" I d.
103. 372 U.S. at 48.
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against them stood to be satisfied out of income- or non-incomeproducing property."104 Similarly, in Woodward the Supreme
Court noted that "[a] test based upon the taxpayer's 'purpose' in
undertaking or defending a particular piece of litigation would encourage resort to formalisms and artificial distinctions.m 015 Nevertheless, the Court reserved judgment as to the tax treatment of
costs incurred in litigation that may only indirectly affect the title
to property. 108 Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit supplied an answer
in Madden v. Commissioner, 107 applying an origin-of-the-claim
standard to the expense of litigation concerning the rights of the
government to take a fee interest by a condemnation proceeding
instead of a less drastic alternative with no regard to the use of the
land in the taxpayer's business.
The agency initiated the condemnation proceedings here for a taxneutral purpose. Where this is so, there is no inherent unfairness to
the taxpayer. Furthermore, all taxpayers with capital assets affected
by the agency's actions will be similarly treated. Finally, the element
of certainty, particularly desirable in tax law, is enhanced. 108

The application of the origin-of-the-claim test is still developing.
In the context of litigation, the Tax Court has held
Quite plainly, the "origin-of-the-claim" rule does not contemplate a
mechanical search for the first in the chain of events which lead to
the litigation but, rather, requires an examination of all the facts.
104. Id.
105. 397 U.S. at 577.
106. Id. at 578.
107. Madden v. Commissioner, 514 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975). See also Estate of Baier v.
Commissioner, 533 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1976); Anchor Coupling Co. v. United States, 427 F.2d
429, 433 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 908 (1971).
108. 514 F.2d at 1152. When the Tax Court decided Madden v. Commissioner, 57 T.C.
513 (1972), it had reluctantly followed Reakirt v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 1296 (1934), aff'd
per curiam, 84 F.2d 996 (6th Cir. 1936). In Reakirt, the Board of Tax Appeals held that
litigation similar to Madden's was not in defense of title, but was for the prim~ purpose of
preventing "the taking of the land itself by the exercise of the power of condemnation." 29
B.T.A. at 1297. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the Tax Court's application of the
primary purpose analysis was incorrect. The court reversed the Tax Court's holding, applying the origin-of-the-claim test and finding that Madden's litigation ultimately involved the
sale and acquisition of the land; consequently, the expenses were not currently deductible.
514 F.2d 1149.
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The inquiry is directed to the ascertainment of the "kind of transaction" out of which the litigation arose. . . . Consideration must be
given to the issues involved, the nature and objectives of the litigation, the defenses asserted, the purpose for which the claimed deductions were expended, the background of the litigation, and all
facts pertaining to the controversy. 109

The search for the origin of an expenditure is not always ea.Sy.110
Even pre-Woodward cases which purported to apply an origin-of-_
the-claim or related test tended to bifurcate claims arising out of
arguably related capital transactions. For instance, in Beerman v.
United States, 111 the taxpayer guaranteed a purchase contract in
which his controlled corporation was the purchaser; as security for
the purchase price, he had deposited in escrow a negotiable note
payable to him. Mter execution of the sales agreement, the seller
sued both the corporate purchaser and the taxpayer, alleging that
they had failed to fulfill certain obligations, claiming entitlement
to the escrowed note, and claiming that interest payments therefrom to the taxpayer should cease as well. Purportedly relying
upon Gilmore, the Sixth Circuit in Beerman concluded that the
expenses originated in- the taxpayer's business activities and that
the income producing property, viz., the negotiable note, was the
subject of the suit. Consequently, the court held the legal expenditures were deductible as directly related to the management, con109. Boagni v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 708, 713 (1973); accord, Estate of Baier v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 513, 520 (1975), aff'd, 533 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1976).
110. See Lykes v. United States, 343 U.S. 118 (1952). In Lykes, the taxpayer deducted
legal expenses incurred in contesting a gift tax assessment, characterizing them as a cost of
conservation of income producing property. The Supreme Court, in an opinion relied upon
in its Gilmore decision, decided to look only to the origin of the claim, not to the potential
consequences of the litigation. Justice Jackson, in a dissenting opinion, disagreed with the
Court's notion of the claim's origin:
Of course one can reason, as my brethren do, that if there had been no gifts there
would have been no tax, if there had been no tax there would have been no deficiency, if there were no deficiency there would have been no contest, if there were no
contest there would have been no expense. And so the gifts caused the expense. The
fallacy of such logic is that it would be just as possible to employ it to prove that the
lawyer's fees were caused by having children • • • • So treacherous is this kind of
reasoning that in most fields the law rests its conclusion only on proximate cause and
declines to follow the winding trail of remote and multiple causations.
Id. at 128.
111. 390 F.2d 638 (6th Cir. 1968).
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servation and maintenance of income producing property. In contrast, on substantially similar facts, but after the Supreme Court's
decision in Woodward, the Eighth Circuit properly held in Helgerson v. United States 112 that the origin of a claim against similarly
escrowed assets originated in the process of disposition of a capital
asset and suggested that Beerman had been eroded by Woodward.118 Similarly, capitalization has been required of legal expenses which ordinarily might be deductible where the related
claim, although not a part of the process of disposition, was integrally related to acquisition or disposition of a capital asset. In
Great Lakes Pipeline Co. v. United States, 114 a corporate taxpayer
entered into employment contracts with its key executives securing
their positions in the event of a negotiated sale of the corporate
assets. Subsequently the taxpayer was required to make payments
to the purchaser (which had assumed these contractual obligations) so that it would retain the executives. Such payments by the
corporation were held capital expenditures since they were made in
connection with the sale (and at the time of the sale) and constituted an integral part of the· transaction whereby the taxpayer disposed of all of its capital assets. 1115
Other pre-Woodward decisions bifurcated what would probably
be treated under Woodward as a related transaction subject to the
origin-of-the-claim test. For example, in Naylor v. Commissioner, 116 an option to purchase capital assets was exercised; thereafter, a dispute arose as to valuation of the assets. Regarding the
disposition of the capital assets as consummated and the subsequent controversy as no more than enforcement of the terms of the
agreement, the Fifth Circuit held that the expenses of its enforcement were deductible under section 212 as expended in collection
of income. Similarly, where a corporation was liquidated but the
transaction was held open117 for collection of a contingent claim,
112. 426 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1970).
113. Id. at 1297.
114. 352 F. Supp. 1159 (W.D. Mo. 1972), aff'd in unpub. order, (8th Cir. May 23, 1974).
115. Id. at 1172. In Plym v. United States, 338 F. Supp. 717 (W.D. Mich. 1971), the court
held that a compromise settlement of a finder's fee claimed in a transaction that resulted in
a merger had its origin in and its character determined by the merger and, hence, was
capital.
116. 203 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1953).
117. The classic statement of open-transaction is contained in Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S.
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and a former shareholder incurred litigation expenses in effecting a
settlement of the portion of that claim distributed to him, the legal
expenses were held currently deductible as costs of collecting sums
due the taxpayer under a "fully executed and enforceable contract."118 The Second Circuit reasoned that the only disposition of
a capital asset was the exchange of stock in the liquidation for a
share of the liquidated company's assets; further repayments
under the contingent claim were capital gains not because they
represented the sale or exchange of a capital asset but because
their collection constituted part of the gain from the sale or disposition of the shareholder's stock in the corporation.119
The better view is that the expenses of collecting the proceeds of
a disposition of property should be treated no differently than the
other expenses incident to that disposition. 120 Moreover, in Estate
of Meade v. Commissioner, I:n the Fifth Circuit held that stockholders' legal expenses in connection with settlement of an antitrust damage claim distributed to them upon liquidation of the
corporation were not deductible as ordinary and necessary business
expenses nor as expenses for production of income; rather, such
404 (1931):
The promise [to pay annually based on amount of ore mined, without a stated minimum] was in no proper sense equivalent to cash. It had no ascertainable fair market
value. The transaction was not a closed one. . . . [Taxpayer] might never recoup her
capital investment from payments only conditionally promised. • • • [Taxpayer]
properly demanded the return of her capital investment before assessment of any
taxable profit based on conjecture.
Id. at 413.
The courts have used this notion of "open" transactions in liquidation cases where the
amount of consideration was uncertain. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Carter, 170 F.2d 911 (2d
Cir. 1948) (involving oil brokerage commission contracts); Dorsey v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.
606 (1968) (involving patent royalty rights). The position of the Internal Revenue Service is
contained in Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 C.B. 15: The Commissioner will "continue to require
valuation of contracts and claims to receive indefinite amounts of income, such as those
acquired with respect to stock in liquidation of a corporation, except in rare and extraordinary cases." See also Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-1(a). The rules in this area may have been altered
fundamentally by the Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980. See generally Goldberg, Open

Transaction Treatment for Deferred Payment Sales after the Installment Sales Act of
1980, 34 TAX LAW. 605 (1981).
118. Commissioner v. Doering, 39 T.C. 647, 650 (1963), aff'd, 335 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1964).
119. 335 F.2d 738, 741 (2d Cir. 1964).
120. See Munn v. United States, 455 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1972); Helgerson v. United States,
426 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1970).
121. 489 F.2d 161 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 882, reh. denied, 419 U.S. 1060 (1974).
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payments were required to be capitalized and offset against the
long-term capital gain realized by the stockholders under the open
transaction doctrine from settlement of the claims. The court reasoned that the antitrust claim in the hands of the shareholders
originated in the process of the disposition of their stock in the
liquidated corporation; the claim was part of the assets received in
the liquidation and the liquidation was an open transaction for
purposes of collection of the proceeds of the settlement.
Thus, the valuation of the claim . . . was vital to the disposition of
taxpayer's stock, and the litigation necessary for this determination
was an integral part of the overall transaction. Hence, the expenses
incurred in the settlement litigation are properly treated as part of
the cost of the stock exchanged in the liquidation. 122

Certainly where the distributed claim involves a dispute over the
terms of the disposition of a capital asset, expenditures arising
from the dispute are integrally related with the capital asset; and
analysis in terms of collection of a contract right is inappropriate.123
A growing number of origin-of-the-claim cases follow a "proximate cause" analysis. For example, in Munn v. United States, 124
the taxpayer incurred legal expenses in a suit to establish the percentage of the sales proceeds of ce~ stock sold by a trust allocable to him as income beneficiary. He relied upon a number of cases
holding that a trust beneficiary's legal expenses to settle disputes
as to the exact portion of trust distributions to be received are deductible expenses under section 212 as incurred for the management, conservation or maintenance of property held for the production of income, rather than expenses which must be capitalized
as incurred for the acquisition or disposition of property or for de122. !d. at 166. While both the Fifth Circuit in Estate of Meade and the Tax Court in
Estate of Baier v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 513, 522 (1975), af/'d, 533 F.2d 117 (3d Cir. 1976),
attempted to distinguish Doering, its precedential value has been eroded severely, probably
fatally, by progeny of Woodward such as Munn and Helgerson as well as Estate of Meade.
Moreover, Naylor was thought questionable even prior to Woodward. See Spangler v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 913, 919-20 n.15 (9th Cir. 1963).
123. Estate of Baier v. Commissioner, 533 F.2d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 1976).
124. 455 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
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fending or perfecting his interest in property. 12G The Court of
Claims distinguished these cases on the basis that the transaction
was essentially a sale of a capital asset:
It cannot be disputed that without the sale of stock there would
have been no reason to instigate the legal action for collection of the
proceeds of that sale. . . .
It is clear to us that the expenses were incurred as a direct result
of the sale of capital assets and were prompted out of a desire to
collect the proceeds of that sale. We, therefore, feel the best approach to take in this case is . . . to recognize the wisdom of the
proposition that the distinction between expenses incident to a disposition of property and those incident to collection of the proceeds
of the sale is a tenuous distinction in all respects.126

Similarly, in Ransburg v. United States, 127 litigation arose out of a
buy-sell agreement entered into between the taxpayer and his father and two brothers. The Tenth Circuit concluded that since the
buy-sell agreement concerned the disposition and acquisition of
corporate stock, the litigation expenses were not deductible under
section 162 or section 212.128
Any "proximate cause" analysis is unlikely to prevail without
substantial litigation. In Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United
States, 129 the corporate taxpayer purchased a majority interest in a
publishing company at a time when it may have known that litigation against the existing management would be necessary to protect its purchase. Shortly after consummating the transaction, the
taxpayer did in fact bring an action against the management anal125. See, e.g., Rowe v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 382 (1955); Tyler v. Commissioner, 6 T.C.
135 (1946).
126. 455 F.2d at 1033 (Ct. Cl. 1972).
127. 440 F.2d 1140 (lOth Cir. 1971). See Reed, 55 T.C. 32 (1970).
128. 440 F.2d at 1144. The court also refused to allow the expenses to be added to the
basis of the taxpayer's existing stock in the corporation because the litigation involved
neither the acquisition nor the preservation and defense of the taxpayer's stock interest in
the corporation. Were the district court's conclusion based on the premise that the expenses
related to the other 80% stock interest, this refusal would appear incorrect. See Anchor
Coupling Co. v. United States, 427 F.2d 429, 434 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 908
(1971). It appears more likely that the district court in Ransburg viewed the litigation as
actually personal in origin. See 69-2 U.S.T.C. (D. Kansas July 24, 1969). See generally
[1974] 4 TAX MNGM'T (BNA) § 4.
129. 539 F.2d 929 (3d Cir. 1976).
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ogous to a shareholders' derivative suit. The Third Circuit held
that the costs of such litigation were deductible since the origin of
the claim lay neither in the price paid by the taxpayer for the
stock nor in the value received when it purchased the stock. This
approach would limit Woodward and its progeny to situations in
which the factors of price and value in either the acquisition or
disposition of a capital asset gave rise to litigation. The Newark
Ledger application of the "origin of the claim" test appears contrary to the approach taken in cases such as Great Lakes Pipeline
Co. v. United States, 130 where the district held that payments by
the corporate taxpayer to secure its release from employment contracts of its former executives and to assure their employment by
the purchaser of its assets were capital expenditures because the
employment contracts were executed contemporaneously and in
connection with the sale of the taxpayer's assets. In short, Newark
Ledger is contrary to a proximate cause approach and seems to
rest upon the erroneous premise that certain expenditures are inherently section 162 (business expenses) or section 212 (expenses
for the production of income), while others are inherently
capital. 131
Similar problems in searching for the origin of the claim are
epitomized by cases such as Mitchell v. United States, 132 where
the taxpayer was the chief executive officer and controlling shareholder of a corporation acquired by a second corporation in a taxable transaction. He and the acquired corporation made certain
warranties as to contingent liabilities of the acquired corporation.
Since the taxpayer was chief executive officer, the acquiring company also sought information from him regarding the acquired
company's operations and financial condition. After the sale, the
taxpayer continued to conduct business as a corporate official of
numerous corporations. Approximately three years after the sale,
the acquiring company sued the taxpayer and other former shareholders of the acquired company, alleging that all of them, and in
particular the taxpayer, had fraudulently misrepresented facts re130. 352 F. Supp. 1159, 1172 (W.D. Mo. 1972), atf'd in unpub. opinion, (8th Cir. May 23,
1974). See text accompanying notes 114-15 supra.
131. 539 F.2d 929 (3d Cir. 1976).
132. 408 F.2d 435 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
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lating to the acquired company's contingent liabilities; and that
fraud, deceit, misrepresentations and concealment caused the acquiring company to suffer damages in excess of twice the amount it
had paid for the stock itself and in excess of six times the amount
which the taxpayer had personally received. The government contended that the taxpayer's legal expenses were incurred in connection with a capital transaction (the sale of the acquired company's
stock to the acquiring company) and, hence, were non-deductible
capital expenditures. The Court of Claims responded that the government's automatic application of a "but for" rule ignored the acquired company's allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation and
breach of fiduciary obligation to the acquired company by the taxpayer in his capacity as its president and director. The Court of
Claims held for the taxpayer, basically on the ground that the origin of the suit was more than just the capital transaction:
[The acquiring company] went for much bigger game alleging that,
because of [the taxpayer] Mitchell's fraudulent misrepresentations,
it was entitled to damages in excess of $3,700,000, considerably more
than twice the amount [the acquiring company] . . . had paid for
the [acquired company's] ... stock in the first place. To reiterate, it
was in his unsuccessful defense of these charges that Mitchell incurred the expenses in question. The fact that later [the acquiring
company] ... and Mitchell settled their dispute on the basis of revising the stock purchase price is of no moment. 133

In Locke v. Commissioner, 134 an insider was sued for failure to
inform a seller of securities of facts affecting their value. Distinguishing Mitchell, the Tax Court held that the origin of the claim
was in the process of acquisition itself, because the taxpayer did
not possess the requisite business relationship as a corporate executive to the corporation. In such circumstances, an insider's failure
to inform cannot be divorced from any purchase or sale by him of
securities. 13 ~ Moreover, Mitchell's suggested distinction that ex133. Id. at 442.
134. 65 T.C. 1004 (1976), af/'d, 568 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1978).
135. 65 T.C. at 1011-12. More recently, in Bradford v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 584 (1978),
the taxpayer sought to deduct the amount paid in settlement of a suit against him by the
Securities Exchange Commission. The case involved the use of inside information in violation of § 10(b)5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1976), by a bro-
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penses to defend a claim arising from a breach of duty by the taxpayer in his separate capacity as a corporate executive are deductible appears questionable in light of recent developments as to
deductibility of payments by an insider for violations of the shortswing sales provisions of section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.188 The majority view in that area refuses to bifurcate
the sale or exchange and the subsequent payment of the penalty on the basis of the taxpayer's dual capacities, officer and
shareholder. 187
On the other hand, the origin of the claim may be non-capital
where in the course of litigation relating to a capital transaction,
the character of the controversy is altered by the introduction of a
claim or counterclaim against or by the taxpayer totally unrelated
to the capital transaction, but capable of being traced to it under a
but-for test. For example, in Eisler v. Commissioner, 188 the taxpayer accepted employment conditioned upon a right to acquire a
substantial equity interest in his new corporate employer, which
right he subsequently exercised. Upon his termination of employment, the former employer sued to reacquire the stock. The initial
litigation, therefore, was related solely to a capital transaction; but
its character altered when discovery revealed a potential negligence
ker-dealer in the purchase of stock for his personal account. The taxpayer argued that his
purpose in making prompt settlement (the case was settled in less than a month) was to
protect his reputation as a broker-dealer. He attempted to distinguish Locke in order to
avoid its emphasis on the origin of the claim. The court rejected this argument and held
that the expense related to the acquisition of a capital asset, the stock. Similarly, in Redwood Empire Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 960 (1977), the taxpayer sought
to deduct litigation expenses of a suit arising out of its purchase of land. The plaintiff
sought punitive damages based on an allegation of fraud and payment of the purchase price
or return of the land. The attorney testified that he advised settlement in order to avoid
exposure to punitive damages. The court held that motive was irrelevant, and that the taxpayer had failed to convince the court that the "claim was based on something that would
directly affect petitioner's business aside from casting doubt on the title to one of petitioner's assets." 68 T.C. at 978.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b)(l976). The section prohibits speculation by insiders in the securities of their corporation by requiring them to forfeit all "short-swing" profits; i.e., profits
realized from any purchase and sale of the corporation's securities within any period of less
than six months, regardless of any subjective intent to gain from speculation.
137. See Brown v. Commissioner, 529 F.2d 609 (lOth Cir. 1976) and authorities cited
therein. For a discussion of the Arrowsmith tax benefit doctrine relied upon therein and the
origin-of-the-claim test see notes 141-83 infra and accompanying text.
138. 59 T.C. 634 (1973).
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claim by the former employer against the taxpayer arising out of
his employment. The Eisler court concluded that the taxpayer's
settlement payment secured releases from both the stock claim
and the potential negligence claim, holding the part of the settlement related to the stock claim as "deductible only as a capital
outlay and the remaining portion represented a business expenditure deductible in full from ordinary income."139 But for the original suit to regain the stock, the negligence claim would probably
never have been discovered; however, the court appears correct in
its conclusion regarding the business rather than capital transaction origin of the negligence claim. Significantly, while the Eisler
court began its analysis with the origin of the claim test, it also
reasoned that
[t]o the extent that the payment is properly allocable to the stock, it
represents in the context of this case nothing more than a charge
against the capital gain that he realized upon the sale of the stock,
cf. Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6, and not a business loss,
9(. United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93. 140

The court then pointed out that the tax character of the legal expenditures must be determined pursuant to the same principles
that governed the nature of the settlement payment, relying on
Woodward and its progeny. This relationship between Arrowsmith
and the origin-of-the-claim test is highly significant. It focuses
upon the underlying principles at the heart of the capitalization
doctrine with respect to those expenditures that do not literally
enhance or create a capital asset.
IV. TAX

BENEFIT RULE

In Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 141 the shareholder-taxpayers
paid a judgment in 1944 against a dissolved corporation, whose assets had been distributed to them in the years 1937 through 1940.
The taxpayers had reported the liquidating distributions as capital
gains, thereby paying "less income tax than would have been required had the income been attributed to ordinary business trans139. Id. at 640.
140. Id. at 641.
141. 344
6 (1952).

u.s.
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actions for profit. "~ The taxpayers then deducted the payment in
satisfaction of the judgment as an ordinary business deduction,
claiming the full amount paid because of their transferee liability.
The Commissioner viewed the deduction in the subsequent year as
part of the original liquidation transaction, requiring classification
as a capital loss, just as the taxpayer had treated the original liquidating distributions as capital gains. The Supreme Court reasoned
that the payment was not based on any ordinary business transaction of the taxpayers apart from the liquidating proceedings. The
taxpayers did not deny that had payments been made in the same
tax years as the liquidating distributions, the losses would have
been properly treated as capital, reducing the amount of capital
gains received during those tax years. The taxpayers urged, however, that because the judgment was paid in a subsequent year,
even though it would have constituted a capital transaction in the
prior year, it was effectively transformed into an ordinary business
deduction under the well-established principle that each taxable
year is a separate unit for tax accounting purposes. The Supreme
Court rejected their reasoning, replying:
42

[T]his principle is not breached by considering all of the 1937-1940
liquidation transaction events in order to properly classify the nature of the 1944 loss for tax purposes. Such an examination is not
an attempt to reopen and readjust the 1937-1940 tax returns, an action that would be inconsistent with the annual tax accounting
principle.148

Many early cases interpreted Arrowsmith as applicable only
where the original transaction was not fully closed and the subsequent transaction was a part of the original transaction. For example, in Wener v. Commissioner, 144 the Ninth Circuit treated an
agreement by retiring partners as partially executory as to the remaining partners who were yet required to pay the balance of the
sales price. The court viewed their subsequent release as a part of
the original transaction. "It not only grew out of it, but its very
existence related back to the agreement of dissolution of partner142. Id. at 7.
143. Id. at 8-9.
144. 242 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1957).
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ship and the Bill of Sale which transferred the capital assets.... " 14 ~ Similarly, other early cases held,that such a subsequent transaction was an "adjustment"/'6 or "renegotiation" and
"revision" of the original sale.1 " 7 Some more recent decisions still
follow this approach. Estate of McGlothlin v. Commissioner148 applied Arrowsmith to an indemnity paid in a later year because it
was made in discharge of an obligation that was part of the original
transaction in the prior year. The court viewed the payment as
part of the purchase price, a capital expenditure that must be added to the cost basis and reflected in the gain or loss realized from
the ultimate disposition of the investment. As the Fifth Circuit explicitly stated in Alvarez v. United States/"9 "[s]ituations in which
there has been a relation back to prior transactions in earlier tax
years to determine the taxable nature of a subsequent transaction
have been cases where the subsequent transaction was an amendment or modification of the original one."uo The majority of Tax
Court decisions also seem to view Arrowsmith as applicable only
where the transaction in the subsequent year is "merely an adjustment" of the prior transaction, and not a new and independent
transaction. 1 ~ 1

The adjustment or modification view is too narrow and, more
significantly, has led to apparently erroneous limitations of Arrowsmith. For example, in Campagna v. United States, ~ the Second
Circuit refused to apply Arrowsmith to determine the character of
payments received in excess of the value set in "closing" a liquidation transaction. Consequently, the excess was taxed as ordinary
income rather than sharing the capital gain treatment of the original transaction. The court held that: (a) payment of such excess
did not qualify as a sale or exchange; and (b) Arrowsmith did not
apply since it involved situations where the tax treatment accorded
a subsequent adjustment to an earlier sale or liquidation was de1 2

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
Inc. v.
152.

Id. at 946.
Estate of Shannonhouse v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 422, 424 (1953).
Wener v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 529, 533 (1955), aff'd, 242 F.2d 938 (9th Cir. 1957).
370 F.2d 729, 732 (5th Cir. 1967).
431 F.2d 1261 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 913 (1971).
Id. at 1264.
See, e.g., Bresler v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 182, 187 (1975); Arthur H. DuGrenier,
Commissioner, 58 T.C. 931, 939 (1972).
290 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1961).
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termined by considering the nature of the earlier transaction. 1113 In
a closed transaction situation, the Campagna court reasoned, there
was no subsequent adjustment. The payments actually made in the
subsequent tax year were at all times unconditionally required to
be made by the terms of the original transaction; they were merely
in excess of the fair market value established when the original
transaction was closed. 1114 The analysis relating Arrowsmith to only
open transactions has also led to a bifurcation of transactions, epitomized in a series of Tax Court decisions (all of which were reversed on appeal) involving payments pursuant to the short-swing
profits rule of section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. 1116

The better view of this aspect of Arrowsmith is that where an
integral relationship exists between the earlier transaction and a
subsequent event, the earlier year may be examined to determine
the character of the subsequent event. 1116 In Rees Blow Pipe Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 1117 the Tax Court stated,
153. Id.
154. Of course, Arrowsmith applies to gains as well as losses. See, e.g., Bresler v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 182, 186 (1975); Lowe v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 363, 374 (1965). See also
Rev. Rul. 79-278, 1979-2 C.B. 303, where the service applied Arrowsmith "to a gain that was
integrally related to an earlier loss transaction." An accrual method taxpayer incurred a loss
on the sale of stock. The taxpayer filed suit against the issuer alleging that the loss was due
to a violation of federal securities law. The Commissioner ruled that the settlement payment
would take the character of the earlier capital loss, and, therefore, would constitute capital
gain in the year the court approved the settlement.
155. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976). See notes 136-37 supra and accompanying text; Mitchell
v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 170 (1969), rev'd, 428 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 909 (1971). In that case, a vice-president of General Motors Corp. sold some GM stock
in 1962, reporting long term capital gain on the transaction. Later, in 1963, he bought more
GM stock. Because the two transactions took place within 6 months, the taxpayer was
forced, under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to pay over to his employer
the "profit" he made on the transaction. The Tax Court held that the repayment would lead
to a deduction against ordinary income, finding "no relationship" between the 1962 capital
gain and the 1963 § 16(b) payment. See also Cummings v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 1 (1973),
rev'd, 506 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 913 (1975); Brown v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. 1300 (1973), rev'd, 526 F.2d 609 (lOth Cir. 1976); Anderson v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1370 (1971), rev'd, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973).
156. See, e.g., note 154 supra and cases cited therein; Rabinowitz, Effect of Prior Year's
Transactions on Federal Income Tax Consequences of Current Receipts or Payments, 28
TAX. L. REV. 85, 97 (1972).
157. 41 T.C. 598 (1964), aff'd, 342 F.2d 990 (9th Cir. 1965).
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The rule that each year stands on its own feet does not mean, however, that an examination of a previous year's return may not be
made in order to determine the nature of the new fact for the purpose of ascertaining how the new fact is to be classified in computing taxable income for the year in which the new fact . . .
happened. 1118

Looking to prior years is only one aspect of Arrowsmith. Another
is that where such an integral relationship exists between the two
transactions, the character of the transaction in the earlier year
will flavor the character of the transaction in the subsequent year.
If the payment would have been capital if made in an an earlier
year, it still must be capital when actually made in a subsequent
year. "[I]n applying the Arrowsmith doctrine [it makes no difference] whether the expenditures were made voluntarily or under a
legal obligation to make them. The relationship of the payments to
the sale transaction here is what determines the character of the
deduction."1159 This aspect of Arrowsmith rests on the same principles as the origin-of-the-claim test. As the Court of Claims articulated in Towanda Textiles, Inc. v. United States, 160 in reliance on
Arrowsmith, "[e]xpenses necessarily incurred to realize a capital
gain reduce the amount of that gain and partake of the nature of
the gain to which they relate."161 Subsequently, the Court of
Claims explicitly linked together Arrowsmith and Woodward and
Hilton Hotels.
In Arrowsmith, the Supreme Court looked to the nature of the original transaction to deny business expense deductions claimed under
the predecessor of subsection 162(a). Since the expenses in question
arose from a capital transaction, reasoned the Court, expenses incident thereto should have been treated as capital items. This doctrine was later applied in both sub-section 162(a) and 212(2) contexts in Woodward and Hilton Hotels. Again, the nature of the
original transaction was crucial to the determination. Where the
original transaction was a capital transaction, expenses flowing
158. Id. at 603.
159. Turco v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 631, 635 {1969); accord, Kimbell v. United States,
490 F.2d 203, 205 {5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 {1974).
160. 180 F. Supp. 373 {Ct. Cl. 1960).
161. Id. at 378.
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therefrom had to be capitalized. 163

The origin-of-the-claim aspect of Arrowsmith undermines the
cases which refused to apply Arrowsmith where the taxpayer, motivated by a business purpose, made a payment in a subsequent
year which arose out of a prior capital transaction. 163 Similarly, any
threshold requirements to the application of the Arrowsmith rule
- such as legal obligation for payment or a limitation which would
turn on the capacity in which the taxpayer made the payment would be erroneous. 16' In short, Arrowsmith applies the origin-ofthe-claim doctrine in all cases where the payment is made in a year
subsequent to the original transaction. It is not limited to subsequent payments that are actually a portion of the earlier transaction; nor can the Arrowsmith rule be explained solely on the basis
of characterizing those payments that are a part of the acquisition
cost or enhancement of a capital asset, a portion of which is paid
in a subsequent year. Arrowsmith is applicable as well where the
expense does not create or enhance a capital asset, but is integrally
related to a capital transaction and flavored by it because failure to
equate the tax character of the two transactions would result in a
distortion of income.
In United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 165 the Supreme Court described Arrowsmith as preventing unfair tax windfalls otherwise
created by the annual accounting principle. In Skelly Oil, the taxpayer had received income, subject to a potential return requirement, reported the income in the year received under the "claimof-right" doctrine/ 66 and claimed offsetting percentage depletion
162. Sharples v. United States, 533 F.2d 550, 554 (Ct. CI. 1976). Accord, Kimbell v.
United States, 490 F.2d 203, 204 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 833 (1974).
163. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 170, 175-76 (1969), rev'd, 428 F.2d 259
(6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909 (1971).
164. See, e.g., Anderson v. Commissioner, 480 F.2d 1304, 1308 (7th Cir. 1973), where the
Tax Court's distinctions drawn along those lines were rejected. The Tax Court had stated
that the taxpayer was not required to pay his short-swing profits back, there being no judgment against him; therefore, he must have been motivated by a business purpose (to retain
his job). Moreover, the Tax Court had attempted to distinguish the taxpayer's sale of the
stock in his capacity as shareholder from his pay back of the profits as an "insider" subject
to § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
165. 394 u.s. 678 (1969).
166. In North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932) the Court formulated what is now known as the "claim-of-right" doctrine:
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deductions. In a subsequent year, the taxpayer was forced to return the income previously reported, and it claimed a deduction
under a corollary to the claim-of-right doctrine.167 Originally judicially created, the doctrine had been partially codified in section
1341,168 and the taxpayer in Skelly claimed a deduction in the year
of repayment under section 1341 for the full amount of the item
previously reported. The Supreme Court held that the Internal
Revenue Code should not be interpreted to allow the taxpayer "the
practical equivalent of a double deduction.m69 Accordingly, the
Court required that the section 1341 deduction allowable in the
year of repayment be reduced by the percentage depletion allowance previously claimed by the taxpayer.
The claim-of-right doctrine itself and the deduction in the subsequent year result from the annual accounting principle whereby
each year's tax must be definitively calculable at the end of the tax
year. 170 The Supreme Court pointed out in Skelly Oil, however,
that:
the annual accounting concept does not require us to close our eyes
as to what happened in prior years. For instance, it is well settled
that the prior year may be examined to determine whether the reIf a taxpayer received earnings under a claim of right and without restriction as to
its disposition, he has received income which he is required to return, even though it
may still be claimed that he is not entitled to retain the money, and even though he
may still be adjudged liable to restore its equivalent.
Id. at 424.
167. If the taxpayer who has reported income under the claim of right doctrine is forced
to return it, a deduction is allowed in the year of the repayment. !d.
168. I.R.C. § 1341.
169. 394 U.S. at 680 (quoting Charles llfeld Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62, 68 (1934)).
The operation of § 1341 is illustrated in Shipley v. United States, 608 F.2d 770 (9th Cir.
1979). The taxpayer received money in 1967 that he treated as a gift and did not report.
Four years later, a state court determined that the donor lacked capacity and that the taxpayer would have to return the money. The I.R.S. issued a notice of deficiency, classifying
the money as income in the year of receipt, which the taxpayer challenged in Tax Court.
The taxpayer also instituted a refund suit in district court, asserting a deduction under
§ 1341 by reason of the repayment. Citing Skelly Oil, the Ninth Circuit held that the deduction under § 1341 was limited to the extent the amount repaid was previously subjected
to taxation, but that it was not necessary for the taxpayer to voluntarily report the amount.
The court stayed the refund suit pending a decision in the Tax Court, refusing to grant a
refund until it was determined that the amount should have been reported in the year of
receipt.
170. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
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payment gives rise to a regular loss or a capital loss. Arrowsmith v.
Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952). The rationale for the Arrowsmith
rule is easy to see; if money was taxed at a special lower rate when
received, the taxpayer would be accorded an unfair tax windfall if
repayments were generally deductible from receipts taxable at the
higher rate applicable to ordinary income. The Court in Arrowsmith
was unwilling to infer that Congress intended such a result.
Accordingly, Arrowsmith teaches that the full amount of repayment cannot . . . be allowed as a deduction.
This result does no violence to the annual accounting system.
Here, as in Arrowsmith, the earlier returns are not being reopened.
And no attempt is being made to require the tax savings from the
deduction to equal the tax consequences of the receipts in prior
years. 171
The Supreme Court next compared the analogous approach of the
classic "tax benefit" doctrine 172 citing Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp.
v. United States, 173 where the Court of Claims stated:
The return or recovery of property that was once the subject of an
income tax deduction must be treated as income in the year of its
recovery.... The only limitation upon that principle is the socalled "tax-benefit rule." This rule permits exclusion of the recovered item from income so long as its initial use as a deduction did
not provide a tax saving. . . . But where full tax use of a deduction
was made and a tax saving thereby obtained, then the extent of saving is considered immaterial. The recovery is viewed as income to
the full extent of the deduction previously allowed. 174
•

Several cases have described the rule of Skelly Oil and Arrowsmith
as a tax benefit rule. 175 Indeed, the Court of Claims has gone so far
as to attempt to force Arrowsmith and its progeny into the classic
tax benefit rule or restoration to income format. The apparent rationale is that a capital gain or other special deduction followed by
171. 394 u.s. 678, 684-86.
172. Id. at 686 n.5.
173. 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
174. Id. at 401-02.
175. See, e.g., Brown v. Commissioner, 529 F.2d 609, 612 (lOth Cir. 1976); Anderson v.
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1370, 1375 (1971), rev'd, 480 F.2d 1304 (7th Cir. 1973).
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another payment in a subsequent year amounts to a recovery of
the earlier tax benefit from the capital gain deduction, which recovery must be used to reduce the subsequent payment.l76 Arrowsmith and the tax benefit doctrine are closely related, but the principle should not be so strained to show the relationship.
The true relationship between the tax benefit aspect of Arrowsmith and the classic tax benefit rule is twofold: both are necessary
corollaries of the annual accounting principle, and both require a
matching across tax years of transactions that are integrally related in order to prevent a distortion of income. Such a distortion,
in many instances, would produce the practical effect of a double
deduction although a literal double deduction is not necessary to
trigger the tax benefit doctrine. 177 The annual accounting prhiciple
176. Dynamics Corp. of America v. United States, 449 F.2d 402, 412 (Ct. CL 1971).
177. See, e.g., Estate of McGlothlin v. Commissioner, 370 F.2d 729, 732 (5th Cir. 1967);
accord, Arthur H. DuGrenier, Inc. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 931, 938-39 (1972). However,
avoidance of a "double deduction" will not always prompt the court to apply Arrowsmith.
In Continental ill. Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 69 T.C. 357 (1977), acq., 1978-2 C.B. 1, the
Tax Court confronted "the intersection between the tax benefit rule and the closed transaction rule." 69 T.C. at 371. The court rejected the Commissioner's position, based on the
"double deduction" argument of Arrowsmith and Skelly Oil, stating: "[T]his simply begs
the question, assuming that we have one integrated transaction rather than two separate
transactions in two different tax years, which is the very point at issue." Id. (emphasis added). In that case, the taxpayer purchased in 1963 a two-thirds interest in almost $3 million
of conditional sales contracts and chattel mortgages. The contracts represented sales of
"stores on wheels" to Tastee Freez franchisees, and they were guaranteed by Tastee Freez
Industries and by Allied Business Credit Corp. and Carrol's, Inc. (both subsidiaries of Tastee Freez). When all three companies filed Chapter XI petitions, the taxpayer filed a claim
in bankruptcy court based on the guarantees. It received subordinated debentures and common stock in Tastee Freez, which it considered worthless. The Tastee Freez stock and debentures ware valued at $3.00 and the remainder was charged off against a bad debt reserve.
The taxpayer received some additional recovery on the sale of collateral which it credited to
the reserve. Later, Tastee Freez wanted to buy in its outstanding debentures and arranged
an exchange of stock of the debentures held by the taxpayer (erroneously reported as capital
gain). The taxpayer then contributed all of its Tastee Freez stock to a charitable foundation
and deducted its then current value of over $14 per share. The Internal Revenue Service
viewed the 1964 bad debt writeoff and the 1968 charitable contribution deduction as a
double deduction and argued that the subsequent appreciation in the value of the stock
should relate back to the bad debt write-off under the tax benefit rule. The taxpayer contended that the substitution of the stock and debentures for the original guarantee obligation closed that transaction and required computation of gain or loss. Any subsequent gain,
the taxpayer argued, should relate to the appreciation of the securities and constitute a
separate transaction. The Tax Court agreed with the taxpayer, but admitted its result was
"hardly free from doubt." Id. at 365-66. The Commissioner subsequently acquiesced in the
result. 1978-2 C.B. 1.

508

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:473

requires transactions that might be subject to further developments substantially altering their tax character nevertheless to be
treated as final and closed so that their tax consequences can be
determined at the end of the tax year. 178 On the other hand, when
the subsequent event in fact occurs, a taxpayer should not be permitted to take advantage of the annual accounting principle to establish a distorted picture of income for tax purposes. "When the
tax benefit rule is viewed in its true character-as a necessary
counterweight to the consequences of the annual accounting principle-much of the difficulty [of searching for a recovery of "property"] disappears." 179 Similarly, Arrowsmith entails closing a
transaction in an earlier year and then making adjustments in the
subsequent year for subsequent related transactions. Normally, the
"adjustment" simply characterizes the deduction in the subsequent year.
The facts in Skelly Oil constituted the reverse of the classic tax
benefit rule. Income was recognized in the earlier tax year under
the claim of right doctrine and in accordance with the annual accounting principle. When the facts revealed that the amount had
to be returned in a subsequent tax year, a deduction was allowed
for the income previously recognized. The tax benefit aspect of Arrowsmith required that the subsequent deduction be matched with
the earlier income and, accordingly, reduced by the earlier depletion deduction. 180 Under the classic tax benefit doctrine, a deduction is claimed in a prior year; and when subsequent events reveal
that the deduction should not have been allowed, a corresponding
adjustment is made to income in the later tax year, i.e., a restoration to income. In all cases, the adjustment is made in the subsequent year, rather than reopening the prior year and requiring an
amended return, because of the exigencies of the annual accounting principle. 181
178. Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. at 8-9.
179. Estate of Munter v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 663, 678-79 (1975) (Tannenwald, J., concurring); accord, Mayfair Minerals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 82, 86 (1971), aff'd per
curiam, 456 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1972).
180. See notes 166-69 supra and accompanying text.
181. See Montgomery v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 511 (1975). Adjustments, rather than
amended returns, are made whether the subsequent event results in a deduction as a counterbalance to income recognition under the claim of right doctrine, "restoration" to income
under the classic tax benefit doctrine to counterbalance a prior deduction, or altered charac-
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The second and more significant connection among the origin-ofthe-claim, the Arrowsmith tax benefit rule, and the classic tax benefit doctrine, is that two transactions must sometimes be considered together in order to prevent a distortion of the taxpayer's income. This is the basis for the requirement of capitalization under
the claim-of-right doctrine, as well as the usual requirement that a
loss be capitalized under the Arrowsmith doctrine. 182 The underlying similarity to the classic tax benefit doctrine is manifested when
its "principles" are applied to items that are deducted and recovered ("restored") in the same tax year, requiring the deduction and
restoration to be matched to prevent a distortion of income.183

V.

CHANGES IN CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND STOCK TRANSACTIONS

Although courts have applied an enhancement of capital asset
analysis, still another area of capitalization in which the results of
the cases can be reconciled~ if at all, under the tax benefit doctrine
is the proper tax treatment of expenditures associated with
changes in a corporation's capital structure.
Organizational expenses have long been denied status as ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162(a) and its
predecessors. The early decisions did not articulate any rationale
for requiring capitalization of organization expenditures; but a clue
as to the premise of this rule may be seen in the first decision
treating the issue. In F. Tinker & Sons Co.,184 a corporate taxpayer
had assumed certain liabilities in incorporating a predecessor partnership. The Board of Tax Appeals reasoned correctly that the liquidation of a liability assumed by a corporation as part consideration for the purchase or acquisition of assets was not an ordinary
and necessary expense of doing business, but instead constituted a
capital transaction. The court went on to state that the same was
terization of a gain or loss item under Arrowsmith.
182. Arrowsmith applies to income items as well, Lowe v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 363
(1966), sometimes requiring what would otherwise be a capital item to be treated as an
ordinary item where the earlier transaction was ordinary. See Bresler v. Commissioner, 65
T.C. 182 (1975); see also Arthur A. DuGrenier, Inc. v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 931 (1972).
183. Anders v. United States, 462 F.2d 1147, 1149 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064
(1972), reh. denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973); Connery v. United States, 460 F.2d 1130 (3d Cir.
1972); Spitalny v. United States, 430 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1970).
184. 1 B.T.A. 799 (1925).
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true of legal expenses paid in connection with the organization of a
corporation. 18G
In subsequent decisions, it was explicitly stated that the capital
asset acquired was not the property received in exchange for stock
of the new corporation, but the corporate charter itself. 188 Almost
from the beginning of this development, the proper treatment of
corporate expenses of organization and reorganization were considered by authorities as a single issue. 187 The rationale of such decisions was that expenses of a reorganization or expenses of initial
organization constitute amounts expended for assets that would
continue to be useful in the business over several years, "presumably ... increasing and maintaining the earning power of the taxpayer[;] and thus throughout its corporate life the taxpayer will
enjoy the fruits of these expenditures. " 188
A parallel early development was the disallowance of the expenses of issuing stock. In contrast with the organization and reorganization cases, the theory supporting capitalization in these cases
received considerable judicial attention.
Expenses incurred by a corporation in selling its capital stock, the
proceeds from which are to be permanently invested in property or
otherwise used in the operation of the business, subject to all its
risks and hazards, are not deductible expenses, for the reason that
such expenses are incurred in connection with a capital transaction.
The only effect of expenses of this character, as in the case of discount at which the shares of stock may be sold, is to reduce the
capital available to the corporation, and they can not be used to
reduce the income from operation. They represent a capital expenditure which should be charged against the proceeds of the stock
and not recouped out of operating earnings. Further, it is clear to us
that the revenue of a day or a year should not be burdened with the
cost of acquiring additional capital, the benefits from which will inure to the corporation over a long period of years. This is the doctrine generally recognized and adopted in the treatment of expenses
incident to the procuring of temporary capital through the flotation
185.
186.
187.
188.

Id. at 803.
See Malta Temple Ass'n v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 409 (1929).
See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of St. Louis v. Commissioner, 3 B.T.A. 807 (1926).
Id. at 808.
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of bonds and other term securities, and in such cases the expenses
are written off over the life of the indebtedness.1811

The courts recognized the discord between the revenue acts and
the best accounting principles in calculating net income of a corporation. Existing accounting practices would not permit commissions on the sale of stock to be carried as assets on a corporation's
books; consequently, such costs would be charged off as quickly as
profits permitted in order to reflect the true financial condition of
the corporation.190 The authorities also viewed the expenses of issuing stock as relating to capital and not to current operations;
hence, such expenses "should be charged against the proceeds of
the stock, and not be recouped out of operating earnings."191
Clearly, the courts were concerned that allowing deduction of such
commissions against operating expenses would produce a distortion of income.
[T]he controlling consideration [is] that such a commission is a capital expenditure to be charged against the proceeds of the stock, not
recovered from operating earnings. It merely reduces the net returns
from the sale of the stock and reduces the available capital. It has
no relation to operating expenses. It is equivalent for income tax
purposes to the sale of stock at a discount. There can be no substantial difference between the two. The discount in one instance represents the difference between the par value of the stock and the
amount received for it; the commission represents that difference in
the other. A capital expenditure cannot be charged income.192

Taxpayers argued unsuccessfully that the accounting prohibition
against capitalizing such costs as a separate asset on the corporate
balance sheet dictated the ordinary nature of those expenses for
tax purposes. That the expenditure did not create a capital addition or investment for accounting purposes did not render the item
189. Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 3 B.T.A. 932, 935 (1926).
190. Simmons Co. v. Commissioner, 8 B.T.A. 631, 650 (1927), aff'd, 33 F.2d 75 (1st Cir.
1929).
191. Coming Glass Works v. Lucas, 37 F.2d 798, 799 (D.C. Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281
U.S. 742 (1930); accord, Commercial Inv. Trust Corp. v. Commissioner, 28 B.T.A. 143, 148
(1933), aff'd per curiam, 74 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1935).
192. Barbour Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 74 F.2d 163, 164 (lOth Cir. 1934), cert. denied,
295 u.s. 731 (1935).
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a deductible expense for tax purposes. 193
A similar problem of the absence of a definite capital asset arose
when the corporate charter was amended to authorize an increase
in capital stock. "It can be argued, and not without merit, that no
capital asset is acquired when attorneys' fees are paid in connection with an increase in capitalization, but it does not follow that
the payments are ordinary and necessary expenses of the year
when made." 194 Moreover, even if capitalization is increased for a
business purpose, resultant expenses are considered a cost of acquiring capital and consequently non-deductible. 195 With regard to
expenses of merging or reorganizing a corporation, some courts appeared doubtful that a distinct capital asset could be found, but
still allowed no current deduction, drawing an analogy to the treatment of costs incident to the acquisition or sale of property196 the prime example of the origin-of-the-claim test. 197
It was easier for the courts to find that expenses incurred by a
corporation in connection with a redemption of its stock constituted a capital expenditure to be treated as part of the cost of the
stock so purchased. "Certainly, the cost of the stock itself was a
capital expenditure rather than a deductible expense, and the accompanying legal fee must be similarly classified."198

Although these various expenditures were held to be capital in
nature, the cases, with one exception,199 did not allow deductions
for amortization. This result was usually based on the theory that
the corporate franchise had no determinable life - in the case of
193. Van Keuren v. Commissioner, 28 B.T.A. 480, 486 (1933); Baltimore & O.R.R., 29
B.T.A. 368, 372-73 (1933), aff'd, 78 F.2d 460 (4th Cir. 1935).
194. Holeproof Hosiery Co. v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 547, 556 (1928); accord, Fireman's
Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 1004, 1014 (1934).
195. Fishing Tackle Prod. Co. v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 638, 645 (1957).
196. See, e.g., Odorono Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 1355, 1359 (1932).
197. See Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 575-76 (1970); notes 76, 92-140 supra
and accompanying text.
198. Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 173, 183 (1961). But see
Five Star Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 724, 727 (5th Cir. 1966) (citing Corn Prod.
Refining Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955)). The doubtful precedential value of Five
Star is discussed in note 258 infra and accompanying text.
199. Hershey Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A. 867 (1928), modified, 43 F.2d 298
(lOth Cir. 1930) (organizational expenses amortized by corporation with a specified period of
existence fixed by charter).
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organization and reorganization expenditures - or the theory that
there was no separate capital asset which could be amortized-in
the case of stock issues.200
In Malta Temple Association,201 the Tax Court early held, however, that corporate organization expenses were deductible under
the loss provisions of the Code upon dissolution of the corporation
and abandonment of its corporate franchise. In dealing with organizational expenses, the "loss" approach was easy to fit into a capital asset acquisition framework. Viewing the organization expenses
as creating a franchise right, the franchise became worthless and
there was a loss when that right terminated.202 The courts also
held that legal fees incurred in connection with dissolution of a
corporation were deductible expenses.203 The articulated rationale
for deductibility of the liquidation expenses was not that the cost
of liquidation constituted a deductible loss, but that the costs of
dissolution and liquidation were ordinary and necessary business
expenses. In Pacific Coast Biscuit Company v. Commissioner, 204
the Board of Tax Appeals stated:
Dissolution and liquidation will of course occur but once in the case
of any particular corporation, but it is an everyday happening in the
business world. . . . Consequently we are of the opinion that costs
of dissolution and liquidation are both ordinary and necessary expenses within the meaning of the statute.205

Subsequent cases based the deduction of liquidation expenses
upon the aberrant and misleading theory that such expenditures
did not create or enhance a capital asset.206 So articulated, deductibility conflicted with disallowing deductions for expenditures in200. See generally FEn. TAX CooRDINATOR 2d 11 L-3007 (corporate organizational costs),
11 L-3101 (cost of stock-issue), and cases cited therein.
201. 16 B.T.A. 409, 411 (1929).
202. Shellabarger Grain Prod. Co. v. Commissioner, 146 F.2d 177, 185 (7th Cir. 1944);
accord, Liquidating Co. v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 1173, 1189 (1936).
203. See, e.g., Pacific Coast Biscuit Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 39, 42 (1935); accord,
E.C. Laster v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 159, 177 (1940), aff'd and rev'd on other grounds,
128 F.2d 4 (5th Cir. 1942).
204. 32 B.T.A. 39 (1935).
205. Id. at 43.
206. Motion Picture Capital Corp. v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1936).
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curred in increasing capitalization or issuing stock. More significantly, the rationale led to faulty reasoning in the partial
liquidation cases. 207
In contrast to the deductibility of organizational expenses in the
caae of a liquidation, the authorities ruled that no deduction for
such expenses was allowable when the taxpayer merged with another corporation. The early theory was that, whereas in a liquidation a complete extinction of the corporation occurred, all of the
"'rights, powers, liabilities and assets'" survived in a merger, except the " 'indicia and attributes of a corporate body distinct from
that into which it was merged.' " 208
In contrast to the treatment of organizational expenses upon liquidation, previously capitalized costs of issuing stock were held not
deductible upon liquidation under the theory that the costs of raising capital did not result in a separate asset which could be "lost."
It may fairly be said that money expended to form a corporation
results in the acquisition of an asset, namely, the corporate
franchise, which may be considered as a balancing asset, but money
paid out to acquire capital does not result in the acquisition of any
asset other than the capital itself. 200

Where plans for a merger are abandoned, the expenses are deductible as an abandonment loss in a transaction entered into for
profit. 210 This result does not change where the taxpayer ultimately does enter into a capital transaction, such as a merger or
reorganization, provided that proposals or other steps for a merger
were in fact definitely abandoned. 211 But where the various proposals do not have a separate vitality and part of them can be said to
have been used in the ultimate capital transaction, no abandon207." See, e.g., United States v. General Bancshares Corp., 388 F.2d 184 (8th Cir. 1968).
208. Citizens Trust Co., 20 B.T.A. 392, 393-94 (1930). For disallowance of expenses of a
merger see Motion Picture Capital Corp. v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1936).
209. Van Keuren v. Commissioner, 28 B.T.A. 480, 487 (1933).
210. Doernbecher Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 973, 986 (1934), aff'd and remanded, 80 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1936), aff'd, 95 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1938).
211. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co. v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 106 (1950); accord, Picker v.
United States, 371 F.2d 486, 498 (Ct. Cl. 1967); Portland Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 30 B.T.A. 878 (1934).
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ment loss is deductible. 212
For the most part, the above conclusions were not changed by
the decisions in Woodward v. Commissioner 18 and United States
v. Hilton Hotels Corp. 214 or other capital expenditure developments, although the reasoning of some of the cases appears to have
lost its force. On the other hand, the results of cases decided in the
area of partial liquidations, divisive reorganizations and similar areas which display elements both of liquidations and of reorganizations, may well have been undercut both by changes in the 1954
Code and by Woodward and Hilton Hotels.
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, all stock redemptions
constituted partial liquidations; additionally, there was no explicit
statutory provision for carryover of corporate attributes in a reorganization analogous to section 381 of the 1954 Code.2111 In the
1954 Code, Congress also sought (although not wholly successfully)
to separate partial liquidations or corporate contractions - in
which distributions were to be characterized solely at the corporate
level218 - from redemptions in which tax characteristics were to be
determined at the shareholder leveJ.217
The first case in this development was Mills Estate, Inc. v. Commissioner, 218 wherein the Tax Court acknowledged two lines of decisions pointing in opposite directions:
On the one hand, it is firmly recognized that the costs incurred in
organizing or reorganizing a corporation, or of altering its stock
structure, or of selling or disposing of a stock issue, or of acquiring
and retiring outstanding stock, are treated as capital expenditures
rather than as ordinary and necessary business expenses which are
deductible from current income. . . . On the other hand, expendi212. Haspel v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 59, 72-73 (1974), aff'd in unpub. opinion, (8th Cir.
Mar. 20, 1975).
213. 397 U.S. 572 (1970). See notes 76, 92-140 supra and accompanying text.
214. 397 U.S. 580 (1970). See notes 92-140 supra and accompanying text.
215. I.R.C. § 381.
216. I.R.C. § 346 defines a partial liquidation. I.R.C. § 331(a)(a) provides that "[a]mounts
distributed in partial liquidation of a corporation . . . shall be treated as in part or full
payment in exchange for stock."
217. I.R.C. § 302(b)(1) - (4) sets forth four situations in which a redemption of stock
receives capital rather than dividend treatment.
218. 17 T.C. 910 (1951), rev'd, 206 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1953).
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tures incurred in connection with the complete liquidation of a corporation have been held deductible as ordinary and necessary
expenses. 219

The corporate taxpayer engaged in two activities, owning all of the
stock in a corporate subsidiary and also operating substantial real
estate. It sold the real estate and distributed the proceeds to shareholders pro rata in exchange for almost fifty percent of their stock
and then issued new stock in exchange for the remainder of their
old stock. Mechanically, the transaction was accomplished through
an amendment to the corporate charter reducing the authorized
and outstanding capital; the bulk of the distribution was allocated
to the reduction in capital stock; the remainder was charged to
contributed surplus. The taxpayer deducted the legal fees and expenses incurred in the transaction. The Tax Court reasoned that
the expenditures had characteristics of both lines of decisions.
Petitioner's legal expenses were undoubtedly incurred in substantial
part in order to amend its charter and reduce authorized capitalization, thereby providing for the acquisition and retirement of its
stock followed by the issuance of new stock in reduced amount. This
aspect of the transaction certainly brings the case within the first
line of authority. However, the actual distribution of assets in partial liquidation was also a significant factor with respect to which
the legal fees were paid, and it is difficult to perceive why the cost of
a partial liquidation should be any less an ordinary and necessary
business expense than the cost of a complete liquidation.220

Accordingly, the Tax Court allowed the taxpayer to deduct half
the legal expenses (as allocable to the distribution of assets) and
required capitalization of the remaining half. The Second Circuit
reversed because it did not think that the legal fees should be split
into parts and viewed separately to determine their deductibility.
Viewing the entire proceedings as a single transaction under the
step-transaction doctrine, 221 it concluded that the recapitalization
219. 17 T.C. at 914 (citations omitted).
220. Id. at 915.
221. 206 F.2d at 246 (quoting Case v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 283, 286 (9th Cir. 1939)
where the court stated, "For income tax purposes the entire proceeding must be viewed as a
single transaction. Substance and not form controls in applying a tax statute.").

0
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was undertaken in order to give the taxpayer a corporate structure
best suited to carrying on the continued portion of its business and
that the legal services were all necessary steps to that end. "What
occurred was essentially a reorganization-a change in the corporate structure for the benefit of future operations-and the expenses of that sort of a corporate change are not deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses in carrying on a trade or
business."222 The court held the costs were "part of the expenditure needed to give the corporation an intangible asset we may call
its altered corporate structure; and, as were the costs of its original
organization, these expenditures were capital in nature."223
Formalism triumphed in the decade between Mills Estates and
the next landmark partial liquidation decision, Gravois Planing
Mill Co. v. Commissioner. 224 Several courts held that where a corporation was dissolved and its assets transferred to a new corporation in exchange for stock issued proportionately to the shareholders of the old corporation, the entire transaction did not constitute
a reorganization, but amounted to a liquidation of the old corporation the expenses of which were deductible. 225 Furthermore, a
number of cases decided under the 1939 Code held that where a
subsidiary corporation was liquidated and its assets distributed to
its parent, various expenses (including the organizational costs and
the cost of liquidation) were deductible in the year of dissolution,
notwithstanding the continuity of business in the hands of the liquidated corporation's parent.226
In Tobacco Products Export Corp. v. Commissioner, 221 decided
222. 206 F.2d at 246.
223. Id.
224. 299 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1962).
225. United States v. Arcade Co., 203 F.2d 230 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 828
(1953); accord, Braicks v. Henricksen, 43 F. Supp. 254 (W.D. Wash. 1942), aff'd, 137 F.2d
632 (9th Cir. 1943). Under the liquidation-reincorporation doctrine, largely developed under
the 1954 Code, these transactions would have been treated as constituting an "F" reorganization and the costs would have been capitalized.
226. Koppers Co. v. United States, 278 F.2d 946 (Ct. Cl. 1960); accord, Bryant Heater Co.
v. Commissioner, 231 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1956); Commissioner v. Wayne Coal Mining Co.,
209 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1954); Dragon Cement Co. v. United States, 144 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.
Me. 1956), remanded, 244 F.2d 513 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 255 U.S. 833 (1957), on remand,
163 F. Supp. 168 (S.D. Me. 1958).
227. 18 T.C. 1100 (1952).
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before the Second Circuit's reversing opinion in Mills Estate, the
Tax Court maintained its earlier view and allocated the expenses
of a partial liquidation between the reduction in stated capital and
the distribution to shareholders. However, in Standard Linen Service, Inc. v. Commissioner, 228 decided after the Second Circuit's reversal of Mills Estate, the Tax Court appears to have adopted the
Second Circuit's approach of viewing the entire proceeding as a
single transaction, the "dominant aspect" of which governs the tax
character of the expenditures.
In Gravois Planing Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 229 decided under
the 1939 Code, a fifty percent shareholder in a closely held corporation retired from the business. Because the corporation did not
have sufficient cash to cover the "purchase" of his shares, it transferred land and improvements in part payment for the shares. The
Eighth Circuit surveyed the existing cases calling for capitalization
of expenses of a reorganization or recapitalization and concluded
that the theory usually expressed to support the result was that
such expenditures related to a continuing asset. Deductibility of
liquidation expenses was based on the theory that such expenditures did not concern the creation or continuance of a capital asset.
Surveying the partial liquidation cases decided under the 1939
Code, the court noted that since a partial liquidation (under the
1939' Code) was inevitably accompanied by a change in corporate
structure, its expenses would just as inevitably have some connection with the continuing corporate operation. The Gravois court
concluded that while the shareholders and the corporation desired
to keep the organization going, the basic problem with which they
struggled was the disposition of the outstanding stock of the fifty
percent shareholder and not the "change or any desired improvement in the form of the corporate structure. " 230 The court
reasoned:
·Stock retirement, that is, partial liquidation, was the problem and it
was the essence of what transpired. . . . Of course, the transaction
involved a reduction in the corporation's stated capital and a continuance of the corporate activity. . . . These additional facts, how228. 33 T.C. 1 (1959).
229. 299 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1962).
230. Id. at 209.
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ever, are necessary concomitants of this type of partial liquidation.
We regard them as constituting only a secondary and not a dominant aspect of the entire transaction. 231

The Eighth Circuit concluded that the dominant aspect of the
transaction was the liquidation of the fifty percent shareholder's
shares and not recapitalization. Although the court neither agreed
nor disagreed explicitly with the Second Circuit's conclusion in
Mills Estate, the tenor of its opinion was that the Second Circuit's
conclusion (or at least its approach) was incorrect.
Gravois Planing Mill did not address the 1939 Code line of cases
holding that a straight redemption of a shareholder's stock constituted a capital transaction because it was attributable to a capital
asset, viz., the stock.232 Commentators have properly suggested
:that under the 1954 Code, the question of deductibility of costs of
liquidation versus merger should turn on whether the capitalized
organization expenditures, and inferentially the costs of the transaction, would be carried over to the successor organization.233
Other commentators have argued that the partial liquidation cases
should turn on whether the "dominant aspect" of the transaction
more closely resembles a section 346 corporate contraction or a
section 302 redemption determined at the shareholder level.234
It appears that the courts are still following formalism in the

area of merger versus liquidation. On the one hand, the Fifth Circuit has ruled that dissolution expenditures of a corporation are
not deductible when the corporation becomes a constituent of the
surviving corporation in a merger, since the "assets" are not lost
but continue beyond the corporate existence of the constituent corporation and persist as capital assets of the surviving corpora231. Id.
232. See, e.g., Atzinger-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 173 (1961); Commerce Photo-Print Corp., 6 T.C.M. 386 (1947). See generally Cohen, The Deductibility of
Stock Redemption Expenses, 24 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 431, 435 (1973); Phillips, Deductibil-

ity of Legal Expenses Incurred in Corporate Stock Redemptions, Partial Liquidations, and
Separations, 1976 DuKE L.J. 941.
233. B. BITTKER & J. EusTicE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CoRPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, 5-34, 5-35 (4th ed. 1979).
234. Cohen, The Deductibility of Stock Redemption Expenses, 24 CASE W. REs. L. REv.
431, 444 (1973). See notes 215-17 supra and accompanying text.

520

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:473

tion. 2311 While the reorganization considered by the Fifth Circuit
was a "statutory merger,"238 the analysis of whether the attributes
carry over would appear applicable to any reorganization to which
. section 381(c) applies. 237 On the other hand, the Tax Court has
ruled that in a so-called practical merger,238 the old corporation
could be treated as liquidated because only the assets of the "liquidated" corporation were transferred to the surviving corporation
and none of its corporate attributes, rights, privileges, powers, or
franchises were passed to the surviving corporation. The organizational expenses in controversy were therefore a proper deduction
in the final tax return of the liquidated corporation.239 The rationale of the Tax Court was that where an ordinary liquidation is
followed by a surrender of the corporate charter, "a loss deduction
has been allowed on the theory that when complete liquidation
and dissolution occurred a capital asset acquired at the time of organization (the corporate franchise) was lost."240 In the case of a·
statutory merger or consolidation, "no loss deduction has been allowed because the surviving or merged corporation continues to receive the benefit of the corporation expenditures."241 On the other
hand, in a "C" reorganization, such expenditures, if capitalized,
should carry over to the transferee corporation under section
381(c).242 Similarly, in the liquidation of a subsidiary into its parent such assets would carry over unless the strictures of section
334(b)(2) are met. 243 The courts have yet to focus directly upon
this apparent conflict between the cases.
The partial liquidation cases under the 1954 Code continue to be
resolved on the basis of whether the transaction results in a benefit
235. Vulcan Materials Co. v. United States, 446 F.2d 690 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
942, reh. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). The lower court drew an apparently proper distinction between assets which continue to exist and those which cease upon the act of merger.
308 F. Supp. 53, 58 (N.D. Ala. 1969).
236.. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A).
237. I.R.C. § 381(c).
238. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C).
239. Kingsford Co. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 646, 661-62 (1964).
240. Id. at 661.
241. Id.
242. A "C" reorganization, a "practical merger," is defined in I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C). See
I.R.C. § 381(c).
243. I.R.C. § 334(b)(2).
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to the old corporation in its future operations. In United States v.
General Baneshares Corp., 244 the taxpayer was required by statute
to divest itself of its non-banking operations. The taxpayer transferred all of its non-banking assets and stock in non-banking corporations to a newly created subsidiary pursuant to section 351.2411
Then, under a special relief provision of the 1954 Code,246 all of the
stock in the new non-banking subsidiary was distributed pro rata
to the shareholders without redeeming any shares or issuing additional shares. The Eighth Circuit returned to the rationale that organizational expenditures must be capitalized because they were
associated with the corporation's continued operations and betterment for the duration of its existence (or for the indefinite future),
in contrast to being devoted to income production or more immediate corporate needs. The court then applied this rule in the
framework of the "dominant aspect" test of Mills Estate, concluding that while "any distribution or liquidation of capital assets effects some change in the corporate structure, . . . such a change
[must] be of some benefit, tangible or intangible, to the [corporation] in its future operations before it can be deemed more than
incidental to the distribution or liquidation."247 The conclusion in
General Bancshares was that the taxpayer's benefit from the
transaction added nothing of value to its corporate structure and
that it acquired no additional rights from the divestment. The taxpayer's only benefit was the preservation of its banking business
for future business purposes, but the overriding aspect of the plan
of divestment was the distribution of its non-banking assets. 248
One objection to the General Bancshares analysis is the difficulty of predicting results. For example, in Bilar Tool & Die Corp.
v. Commissioner, 249 the Tax Court applied a "dominant purpose" •
test to the expenses of a split-up undertaken to divide the corporation's business and assets between two equal shareholders in order
to continue the business remaining in the old corporation and to
244. 388 F.2d 184, 191 (8th Cir. 1968); accord, Transamerica Corp. v. United States, 254
F. Supp. 504 (N.D. Cal. 1966), atf'd, 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1968).
245. I.R.C. § 351.
246. I.R.C. §§ 1101-1103 (distributions pursuant to Bank Holding Company Act).
247. 388 F.2d at 191.
248. Id.
249. 62 T.C. 213, 218-19 (1974), rev'd, 530 F.2d 708 (6th Cir. 1976).
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eliminate the friction that was obstructing the proper conduct of
the business. 2110 The Tax Court found no improvement or betterment of any capital asset owned by the corporation, nor any acquisition of capital assets, nor any changes in the corporate structure
for the benefit of future operations. Instead, the dominant aspect
of the transaction was a partial liquidation in that the corporation
"divested itself of part of its assets in return for part of its stock
and continued in business on a reduced basis. " 2111 On appeal, the
Sixth Circuit found to the contrary that the divisive reorganization
of a corporation that had been "going down the drain" to produce
two viable corporations clearly added value to the capital structure
of both the original corporation and the successor corporations.
Because of this benefit to the corporations, and because there was
no retirement and withdrawal of capital as in Gravois Planing
Mill, the Sixth Circuit in Bilar Tool & Die held that the expenditures benefited the old corporation by terminating the dissension
which threatened to destroy it. Furthermore, the expenditures
were of capital benefit to both the successor corporations in making possible their creation. 2112
The greater difficulty in resolving partial liquidation cases on the
basis of whether the transaction results in a benefit to the corporation extending for more than one year lies in the conflicts that this
rationale produces with other corporate structure cases. Moreover,
this approach is not wholly consistent with the theories and results
in other capital expenditure areas. The conflicts are readily apparent from the holdings in many of the early corporate structure
cases that expenditures which did not result in a definite capital
asset were nonetheless disallowed as deductible ordinary and necessary business expenses. 2113 The inconsistency can be seen by the
fact that such expenditures in many instances are actually creating
or enhancing only an intangible asset that produces future income
and, as such, would be allowed as ordinary deductions outside the
corporate organization and reorganization area. 2114
250. The Plan of Corporate Separation adopted by Bilar's board of directors is set out at
62 T.C. at 214-15.
251. Id. at 220.
252. 530 F.2d at 712-13.
253. See, e.g., Holeproof Hosiery Co. v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 547, 556 (1928).
254. See Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973) (discussed
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In addition, it is difficult to reconcile the reasoning of some of
these lines of cases, particularly the partial liquidation cases, with
the analysis in Woodward and Hilton Hotels. For example, in Jim
Walter Corp. v. United States, 21515 the Fifth Circuit reasoned that
the rationale for capitalization of expenses incurred in connection
with the acquisition of issuance of corporate stock and other reorganization or recapitalization expenditures is to be derived from
Woodward and Hilton Hotels. The court also cited Estate of
Meade v. Commissioner, 2156 which had pointed out that a share- ·
holder's expenditures in a liquidation must be capitalized because
they are incident to the disposition of a capital asset-his stock.
According to this analysis, the business reasons and benefits for
the change in capital structure, partial liquidation or reorganization are irrelevant. Since the expenditures are associated with a
capital asset, viz., the shares of the corporation, they are nondeductible.
The taxpayer in Jim Walter Corp. also argued that Five Star
Manufacturing Corp. v. Commissioner 157 established that although
expenses of recapitalization or other capital structure changes are
generally non-deductible capital expenses, they are nevertheless
deductible when they arise for a valid business purpose other than
altering the capital structure. The Fifth Circuit replied that due to
the recent rejection of the primary purpose test, it read Five Star
as being "limited to situations where a payment to purchase a capital asset, though capital in nature, is necessary to the taxpayer's
survival." 2158 The Third Circuit was faced with a similar argument
at notes 28-33, 56-61 supra and accompanying text).
255. 498 F.2d 631, 638-39 {5th Cir. 1974).
256. 489 F.2d 161 {5th Cir. 1974), discussed 498 F.2d at 639.
257. 355 F.2d 724 {5th Cir. 1966).
258. 498 F.2d at 639. The taxpayer in Jim Walter Corp. also based its argument on
United States v. Smith, 418 F.2d 589 {5th Cir. 1969). However, the court limited both cases
to their particular facts, stating
The final fatal flaw in [the taxpayer's] arguments is that Five Star and Smith [discussed infra] simply do not establish that any type of primary business purpose will
suffice to convert an otherwise non-deductible expense of recapitalization or other
changes in capital structures into a deductible item. The expenditures in those two
cases were made to save the corporation from dire and threatening consequences. The
court in Five Star stressed the extraordinary factual situation which showed a business emergency .•.• We think the principle followed in the two cited cases should
not be extended beyond the facts of the cases.
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in H. & G. Industries, Inc. v. Commissioner. 259 The court did not
decide whether a redemption or other capital transaction necessary
to the survival of a corporate taxpayer would be deductible because the stock redemption in that case was no more than an astute business decision to take advantage of improved business and
monetary conditions. If Five Star retains any validity, it is probably only as a manifestation of one of the rationales apparently underlying the insolvency exception to recognizing income from cancellation of indebtedness-it's not nice to kick a man who is
already down. 280
If the question of capitalization of organizational expenditures,

reorganization expenditures, expenditures in connection with the
issuance of corporate stock or redemption or transfers of stock
were all approached from the Woodward and Hilton Hotels tax
benefit viewpoint of avoiding distortion of income, many of the
complexities in this area disappear. In all of these transactions, the
corporation recognizes no gain;281 accordingly, to allow it a deduction would produce a distortion of its income.282 Some decisions
have implicitly recognized this rationale. In Arthur H. DuGrenier,
Inc. v. Commissioner 88 a corporation in a year subsequent to a
redemption made an additional payment to the redeemed shareholder. The court, under the Arrowsmith doctrine, treated the payment as an additional portion of the purchase price and, hence,
characterized it as a capital expenditure. The Tax Court noted
that, unlike the usual Arrowsmith transaction, it had not allowed a
capitalloss.284 Instead, the court classified the additional redemption payment as a capital expenditure even though the year of redemption was closed. "The reason is that we are not here con498 F.2d at 638-39 (emphasis added). See also H & G Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 495 F.2d
653, 656-57 (3d Cir. 1974); Skaggs Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 201, 205 (1972).
259. 495 F.2d 653 (3d Cir. 1974).
260. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(b).
261. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 337 (12 month liquidation); I.R.C. § 361 (corporate reorganization).
262. See Gunn, supra note 5, at 492-95.
263. 58 T.C. 931 (1972).
264. In the usual situation, a capital loss is allowed where the prior transaction is closed
because the additional expense cannot be added to basis. In such circumstances, to prohibit
recognition of a loss would in effect cause the taxpayer to be "subject to a double tax, i.e.,
the payment of additional funds without a commensurate increase in basis." 58 T.C. at 939
n.9.
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cerned with a sale, but rather, the redemption by a corporation of
its own stock. Therefore, there is no question of a double tax since
a corporation recognizes no gain in dealing with its own stock."285
Analogously, the Fifth Circuit in Estate of McGlothlin v. Commissioner, 288 required a shareholder who had been a party to a corporate reorganization to capitalize an additional payment in a subsequent tax year that arose out of the original reorganization.
Relying on Arrowsmith, the court refused to allow a capital loss,
since the payment was made. in discharge of an obligation created
in the original tax-free reorganization.
In summary, case law supports the view that expenditures made
in connection with a tax-free transaction (which incidentally constitutes a capital transaction as well) are not currently deductible,
but must be capitalized. To allow a current deduction where the
corresponding "income" is not recognized, would produce a distortion of the taxpayer's income. Such distortion is precluded by
Woodward, Arrowsmith and other authorities comprising the origin-of-the-claim and the tax benefit doctrines. Under this rationale, the various organization, reorganization, redemption, and
stock issuance authorities can be reconciled without creating disharmony with the enhancement of intangible asset cases. Analysis
of the organization/reorganization cases on this basis removes their
conflict with Briarcliff Candy; but the next question is whether
such an analysis is consistent with the tax benefit rule.

Application of the origin-of-the-claim analysis to the facts in
Briarcliff Candy would not result in capitalization of the expenditures. In Briarcliff Candy, the promotion and advertising expenses
were basically designed to produce ordinary income through future
profits and sales. Consequently, no issue arose therein as to the
propriety of coupling ordinary deductions with capital gains or a
nonrecognition transaction. Of course, a sale of the business itself,
thereby including the intangible asset enhanced by the Briarcliff
Candy expenditures, would to a degree287 produce capital gain.
However, in the normal business situation, the taxpayer is not
265. Id.
266. 370 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1967).
267. The sale of an entire business must be fragmented asset by asset into ordinary income and capital gain components. Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1945).
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looking towards capital gains from the sale of the business but towards ongoing profits in making such expenditures.
The deductibility of liquidation costs rests on a completely different rationale; namely, where a capital asset is abandoned or
ceases to exist, a loss is allowed under section 165.268 Application of
this rationale is easy where organizational expenditures are involved, either viewing the franchise as the capital asset or more
properly analyzing the expenditures themselves as constituting the
asset. 269 Furthermore, the expenses of the liquidation itself fits into
the former mold if conceptualized as made incident to a capital
transaction and then added to the basis of the intangible corporate
assets to which the expenses are incident (e.g., corporate structure,
earning power), which assets are then lost upon the liquidation.
The deduction is available at liquidation, simply because it is the
last opportunity to take the deduction. Viewed in this manner,
whenever such capitalized cost can be carried over to a successor
corporation as a corporate attribute under section 381,270 regardless of the type of reorganization or liquidation, any loss deduction
should be deferred until final liquidation. From such perspective,
the partial liquidation cases are in error because the corporation
still exists and, ultimately, can take the deduction. Similarly, capitalized organization expenses are carried over in divisive reorganization under section 355;271 and the successor corporations can
take the deduction.
Generally, expenditures or commissions for issuing stock are not
deductible by a corporation upon its liquidation;272 however, the
Tax Court has held that a corporation is entitled to a deduction at
the time of its liquidation for expenses of issuing shares for promotional activities which constituted, in effect, organizational expenditures. 273 The court pointed out that a corporation can deduct the
fair market value of stock paid as compensation for services. In
this instance, the stock was for services, but no current deduction
268. I.R.C. § 165.
269. See notes 184-88 supra and accompanying text.
270. I.R.C. § 381.
271. I.R.C. § 355.
272. See note 209 supra and accompanying text.
273. Hollywood Baseball Assoc. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 234, 270-71, acq. 1964-2 C.B. 6,
aff'd, 352 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1964).
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had been allowed because the shares had been issued for organizational services. In another decision, the Tax Court held that notwithstanding the rule that corporate expenditures to redeem
shares must be capitalized (since incurred in a capital transaction),
when the redeemed shares are cancelled, the corporate taxpayer is
entitled to an ordinary loss. The court's theory was that cancellation of the redeemed stock eliminates the asset whose basis can be
increased. "The amount is in the nature of an amount expended in
an effort to acquire a capital asset which results in a failure to acquire the asset." 274
VI.

REPAIR OR REPLACEMENT

Treasury Regulation section 1.162-4 sets forth a positive precept~
the cost of incidental repairs which neither materially add to the
value of property nor appreciably prolong its useful life, but only
keep it in an ordinarily efficient operating condition, are deductible
currently as a business expense, provided that the basis of the taxpayer's plant, equipment, or other property is not increased by the
amount of such expenditures. It also contains a negative precept:
repairs which are in the nature of replacements must be capitalized to the extent that they arrest deterioration and appreciably
prolong the life of business property. Moreover, Treasury Regulation section 1.263(a)-1(b) requires capitalization of amounts paid
or incurred that either (1) add to the value, or substantially prolong the useful life, of property owned by the taxpayer, or (2)
adapt such property to a new or different use. Paralleling the positive statement of section 1.162-4, the capital expenditures regulation continues to announce that amounts paid or incurred for incidental repairs and maintenance of property are not capital
expenditures.
Together, these regulations catalogue the traditional guideposts
for determining whether a particular expenditure qualifies as a deductible repair or must be capitalized. In summary, if an expenditure falls within any one of the following categories, it must be
capitalized:
274. Foster v. Commissioner, 1966 T.C.M. (P-H) 11 66,273.
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(1) Materially adds to the value of property;
(2) Appreciably extends the life of property;
(3) Constitutes a repair in the nature of a replacement; or
(4) Adapts property to a new or different use.
Conversely, an expenditure is deductible as a repair if it maintains
the ordinarily efficient operating condition of property used in a
business or constitutes an incidental repair, such as replacement of
a recurring minor item. In addition to these major regulatory principles, the cases have added a gloss under which an otherwise deductible repair is capitalized if part of an overall pattern of rehabilitation.2711 The leading repair case, Illinois Merchants Trust Co.
v. Commissioner, 276 summarizes these rules:
In determining whether an expenditure is a capital one or is chargeable against operating income, it is necessary to bear in mind the
purpose for which the expenditure was made. To repair is to restore
to a sound state or to mend, while a replacement connotes a substitution. A repair is an expenditure for the purpose of keeping the
property in an ordinarily efficient operating condition. It does not
add to the value of the property, nor does it appreciably prolong its
life. It merely keeps the property in an operating condition over its
probable useful life for the uses for which it was acquired. Expenditures for that purpose are distinguishable from those for replacements, alterations, improvements or additions which prolong the life
of the property, increase its value, or make it adaptable to a different use. The one is a maintenance charge, while the others are additions to capital investment which should not be applied against current earnings.277
The following analysis discusses each of these items and then
considers the principles that may underlie the often conflicting re-

275. See notes 332-46 infra and accompanying text.
276. 4 B.T.A. 103 (1926).
277. ld. at 106. The Board of Tax Appeals relied upon its prior decision, Simmons &
Hammond Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 1 B.T.A. 803, 806 (1925), where it had looked to Supreme Court railroad rate cases [Illinois Central R.R. v. I.C.C., 206 U.S. 441, 462 (1907);
Union Pacific R.R. v. United States, 99 U.S. 402, 420 (1878)] for the meaning of capital
expenditures in the context of repairs.
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sults in this area, suggesting a resolution to the otherwise endlessly
litigated issue of what is deductible in the area of repairs.278

A. Expenditures Which Materially Add to the Value of
Property
The material addition to value criterion frequently is indivisible
from the rule that an expenditure to create or enhance a tangible
asset with a useful life of more than one year must be capitalized.279 For example, in Hotel Kingkade v. Commissioner, 280 the
Tenth Circuit held that certain expenditures incurred for items
such as carpets, refrigerators, refluing and repair of heating and
water boilers, closet tanks bowls, cooking ranges, and tile work in a
hotel were capital in nature. "Some were for repairs of a permanent nature which materially added to the value of the property
and appreciably prolonged its life as an operating hotel; and others
were for replacements of furnishings and equipment having a useful life in excess of one year."281 The difficulty of drawing lines in
this area is increased by the fact that any proper repair increases
the value of property as compared with the situation immediately
before the repair. 282 Accordingly, one line of Tax Court cases holds
that the question is whether the expenditure materially increases
the value of the property.288
Some cases have held that an expenditure is not capital in nature where some aspects of the property are permanently improved, but the process of repair itself creates an offsetting detriment, resulting in no net increase in value.284 Allowing a current
deduction for expenditures that do not add additional value has
been carried to the extreme of permitting a current deduction for
the cost of microfilming back issues of a newspaper; even though
the microfilm had a useful life in excess of one year, the acquisition
278. See Gunn, supra note 5.
279. See notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text.
280. 180 F.2d 310 (lOth Cir. 1950).
281. Id. at 312.
282. The Board of Tax Appeals recognized this fact as early as 1926. See Illinois
Merchants Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 4 B.T.A. 103, 107 (1926).
283. See, e.g., Oberman Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 471 (1967); Plainfield-Union
Water Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333 (1962).
284. W.C. Hudlow, Jr. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. 894 (1971).

530

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:473

did not improve the original plant of the newspaper publisher because the microfilm was a duplication of existing copies. 285 Perhaps
the most frequent example of deductibility of expenditures which
do not add to the value of the property are those expenditures incurred in repairs of sudden casualties.286 Cases frequently articulate that such expenditures are deductible because they do not increase the value of the property as it was before the occurrence of
the sudden event that necessitated the repair or restoration. 287
In American Bemberg Corporation v. Commissioner, 288 the Tax

Court allowed a deduction for substantial expenditures to drill
holes and pour cement beneath a basement floor in which sudden
cave-ins had occurred. The taxpayer's purpose was not to improve
or prolong the life of the original plant, but to continue operation
of the plant on the same scale and as efficiently as it had been
before the sudden cave-in. Similarly, oil-proofing a basement to
prevent sudden seepage of oil arising from adjacent oil refinery activities was held deductible in Midland Empire Packing Co. v.
Commissioner 89 because the addition of a concrete lining to floor
and walls of the basement did not add to the value or prolong the
expected life of the property beyond what they had been before
the event which made the repairs necessary.
285. United States v. Times Mirror Co., 231 F.2d 876 (9th Cir. 1956).
286. The "no increase in value" cases are careful to point out that this rule is not limited
to casualty cases. Plainfield-Union Water Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333, 340-41 (1962).
For example, in Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. United States, 558 F.2d 1379 (Ct. Cl. 1977)
the court held that the costs incurred in repairing leaks in gas lines were deductible because
the repairs did not increase the value of the pipelines, nor adapt them to a new use. The
leaks were not caused by any sudden event, but by the gradual drying out of a material used
to seal the joints of the 12-foot sections of iron pipe.
287. See, e.g., Regenstein v. Edwards, 121 F. Supp. 952, 954 (M.D. Ga. 1954); Kansas City
S. Ry. v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 164 (Ct. Cl. 1953); Hensler v. Commissioner, 73 T.C.
168 (1979); Southern Ford Tractor Corp. v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 833 (1958); J.F. Wilcox &
Sons v. Commissioner, 28 B.T.A. 878 (1933); Munroe Land Co. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M.
3 (1966). But see Hubinger v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 960, 964 (1928), a/f'd, 36 F.2d 724
(2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied sub nom, New Haven Bank, Ex'r v. Commissioner, 281 U.S. 741
(1930) (unlike costs of maintaining property through repairs necessitated by a casualty, the
restoration of a major part of the property itself must be capitali2ed where the restoration
has a useful life of several years); Rev. Rul. 77-478, 1977-2 C.B. 81 (distinguishing Kansas
City S. Ry. where railroad undertook similar repairs as a part of a general plan of improvement of its track embankments).
288. 10 T.C. 361 (1948), alf'd per curiam, 177 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1949).
289. 14 T.C. 635 (1950); accord, Collingwood v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 937 (1953).
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Yet, the no increase in value approach ignores certain basic factors. For example, a businessman usually will not incur substantial
expenditures unless they enhance the value of property in the business.290 In Hotel Sulgrave, Inc. v. Commissioner, 291 the taxpayer
argued that the installation of a sprinkler system was a repair because it did not add to the value of the hotel property or prolong
its life. The Tax Court pointed out that the sprinkler system was
required by local law and constituted an improvement having a life
extending beyond the tax year in which it was made. "While it
may not have increased the value of the hotel property or prolonged its useful life, the property became more valuable for use in
the petitioner's business by reason of compliance with the city's
order."292 Similarly, the taxpayer's contention in Russell Box Co. v.
Commissioner 93 that construction of a fence was a current deduction because it did not enhance the value of the property in the
long run was rejected on the grounds that it did increase the value
of the property as to the taxpayer for war work presently performed·by the company.2N The clearest example of the conflict between the criteria of no increase in value and adaptation to the
taxpayer's use is found in Connally Realty Co. v. Commissioner. 295
There the city raised the level of a street, cutting off access to the
taxpayer's building from that street. Changes were made to permit
entrance from the new level, but the value of the property was not
increased, nor its life prolonged, compared to its condition before
the change in street level. The court stated:
This outlay of money is not an expense of business likely to happen any year, but was occasioned by an unusual occurrence, one
that does not often happen at all. Repairs to a building are necessary, and regarded as ordinary although occasioned in unusual degree by storm, flood, or the like. But this building fell into no disre290. Stoeltzing v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 374, 376 (3d Cir. 1959).
291. 21 T.C. 619 (1954).
292. Id. at 621; accord, Red Star Yeast & Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 321 (1955);
Difco Laboratories, Inc. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 660 (1948); Bonwit Teller & Co. v. Commissioner, 17 B.T.A. 1019 (1929), rev'd, 53 F.2d 381 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 690
(1931).
293. 208 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1953).
294. Id. at 454. Accord, Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 599
(1931), rev'd on other grounds, 64 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1933).
295. 81 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1936).
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pair, nor was it physically injured in any way requiring restoration.
The city altered its street with detriment to the desirability of portions of the building for rent, but, so far as appears, without touching the building. The outlay was made in an effort to adapt the
building to changed surroundings, but not to repair any physical
damage to it. The withdrawal of a railroad frontage or the change of
a neighborhood from residential to business or the like sometimes
requires remodeling or altering buildings to maintain their
rentability. These are not ordinary expenses, although necessary,
but are additional investments; not repairs, but improvements. H
they do not make the property worth more, or to rent for more than
before the change of conditions which required the alterations, they
make it worth much more than it would be without the alterations.
The added investment may forecast a loss, but the loss for income
tax purposes is realized only when the building is disposed of. There
is here a physical structure representing the investment. The benefit
is not limited to the year of the expenditure, but is expected to continue for the life of the property. The expenditure, being considerable, cannot be regarded as an ordinary expense of a single year, but
must be treated as an additional capital investment.296

The second major criticism of the material addition to the value of
property criterion is that it fails to take into account a material
expenditure that adds only minor value to the property.297
B. Expenditures which Appreciably Extend the Life of Property

Occasionally, expenditures are so extensive that they appreciably
extend the life of the entire property. Thus, in Jones v. Commissioner, 298 the taxpayer renovated an historic building that had become so run down its useful life had ended. The court concluded
that the expenditures gave the building a new useful life. More frequently, expenditures involve replacements of portions of the
property. Where the replacement is of a major segment and it has
a useful life or more than one year, the courts generally conclude
296. Id. at 221-22 (emphasis added).
297. See, e.g., Regenstein v. Edwards, 121 F. Supp. 952 (M.D. Ga. 1954); Buckland v.
United States, 66 F. Supp. 681 (D. Conn. 1946); Oberman Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.
471 (1967) (deduction allowed); Farmers Creamery Co. of Fredericksburg, Va. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 879 (1950) (deduction allowed). For a criticism of Oberman Mfg. Co. on this
ground, see Gunn, supra note 5 at 459.
298. 24 T.C. 563 (1955), atf'd, 242 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1957).
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that the improvement constitutes a capital expenditure.299 Consequently, starting a new useful life for a substantial segment of the
whole property is indicative of capital improvement.300
Any expenditure beyond maintenance itself obviously extends
the life of property. Were the sole focal point the life of the property before the repair, all repairs would be capital since they extend the life of the property. Conversely, the test should not be
whether the original life of the property is extended301 since few
expenditures, even if clearly capital, would extend the original life
of the property after substantial depreciation has occurred. Many
cases take the middle road in determining whether the expenditures enhance the life expectancy of the property as compared with
its status prior to the condition which necessitated the expenditure. 302 The sudden event or casualty cases can be reconciled with
the extension of the life of the property principle under this
analysis.
C. Repairs in the Nature of Replacements

The replacement of a major unit or segment of a capital asset
constitutes an improvement. Classic examples are replacement of a
roof, 303 floor, 304 or wall.305 Some cases look to see whether the expenditure involved a substantial amount of structural work, in
which case it constitutes a replacement and improvement.306 Some
299. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. v. Commisaioner, 279 F.2d 368 {lOth Cir. 1960).
Other decisions reach contrary conclusions by erroneously focusing solely on whether the
expenditure with respect to a part of the property resulted in the entire property gaining
appreciably in value. See Buckland v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 681, 683 {D. Conn. 1946).
300. West Virginia Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 851 {1960).
301. But see Farmers Creamery Co. of Fredericksburg, Va. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 879
{1950).
302. See, e.g., Oberman Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 471 {1967); Plainfield-Union
Water Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333 (1962). The Tax Court in Red Star Yeast & Prods.
Co. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 321, 349 (1955), explained that a "repair involves something
more in the nature of a substitution of new parts or restoration of certain parts of a given
whole, whereas ..• [a capital item is created when] the entire structural unit was replaced
and a new one substituted therefor without relation to the original physical facility."
303. Georgia Car & Locomotive Co. v. Commissioner, 2 B.T.A. 986 (1925).
304. Phillips & Easton Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 455 {1953).
305. Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 599 (1931), rev'd on other
grounds, 64 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1933).
306. Honigman v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 1067 (1971), rev'd in part on another point, 466
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structural expenditures have been held deductible on the grounds
that they did not prolong the life of the property or increase its
value, but only restored the property to the its condition before
the event which demanded the expenditure. 307 Other decisions
point out that the benefits of the replacements extend over a major
period and, hence, must be capitalized.308 Since the regulations and
leading authorities speak of "incidental repairs, " 309 the primary
criterion has been whether a major portion of the property is
replaced.310
Most repair would necessarily involve substitution of new parts or
ingredients for old. If the substitution is of a major unit or structural part of the nature of a floor, wall or roof, or large part thereof,
so that the building as a whole may be considered to have gained
appreciably in expectancy of useful life, it is a substitution so great
in degree that we may well place it on the "replacement" side of the
line.
Where the substitutions, though numerous, are of relatively minor
proportions of the physical structure and of any of its major parts,
even though high in cost, where the building as a whole may not be
considered to have gained appreciably in expectancy of useful life
over its expectancy when built, it falls more naturally on the "repair" side of the line. . . .su

F.2d 69 (6th Cir. 1972). See Farmers Creamery Co. of Fredericksburg, Va. v. Commissioner,
14 T.C. 879 (1950) (deduction allowed where repairs never replaced as much as 50% of a
floor or a wall).
307. Oberman Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 471 (1967); accord, Plainfield-Union
Water Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 333 (1962).
308. P. Dougherty Co. v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 791 (1945), aff'd, 159 F.2d 269 (4th Cir.
1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 838 (1947).
309. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4. See also Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, 72
T.C. 1 (1979). There the court required amortization of maintenance expenses over a 10 year
period. Even though the repairs only restored the irrigation ditches to normal operating
condition and did not alter or expand the system, the court refused to allow current deduction of the expense because to do so would distort the year's income (the expense of "draglining" an irrigation ditch was about the same as building one). The court reasoned that the
expenditure was more than an "incidental" repair; rather, it was a replacement. 72 T.C. at
18.
310. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 368 (lOth Cir. 19$8).
311. Buckland v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 681, 683 (D. Conn. 1946); accord, Red Star
Yeast & Prods. Co. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 321 (1955).
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Viewed from another perspective, substitution of major parts must
be capitalized when the purpose of the expenditure is not to repair
but to put machines in such a condition that they are no longer
unduly susceptible, for example, to breakdowns.312 This analysis
appears closely related to the "put-keep" dichotomy discussed
below.313

D. Adaptation to a New or Different Use
Many cases involve the cost of altering or improving a particular
piece of equipment so that it can function in a different manner, in
which case such cost constitutes a permanent improvement.314
Other cases involve expenditures, though less substantial, which
nonetheless render an entire piece of property (such as a building)
adaptable to the taxpayer's particular business or use and, hence,
constitute an adaptation to a new or different use. 315 The expenditure itself may constitute a permanent change or improvement,
such as rewiring an old building to new commercial standards.316
The better view is that the expenditure need not constitute a separate improvement rendering the property more valuable so long as
it adapts the property to the taxpayer's business, which is different
from a prior business use. 317 The rationale of these decisions is that
the adaptation of a piece of equipment or an entire property to the
taxpayer's use is analogous to a taxpayer's purchase of a new asset,
in which event the purchase price must be capitalized.318 Indeed,
this appears the proper rationale for capitalization of the cost of
any adaptation to a new or different use so long as the expenditure
is substantial. Apparently correct are those cases effectively hold312. Hudlow v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. 935 (1971). See also West Virginia Steel Corp.
v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 851 (1960).
313. See text accompanying notes 322-27 infra.
314. See, e.g., Coors Porcelain Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 682 (1969), aff'd, 429 F.2d 1
(lOth Cir. 1970).
315. West Virginia Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 851 (1960); Alexander Sprunt &
Son, Inc. v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 599, 619 (1931), rev'd on other grounds, 64 F.2d 424
(4th Cir. 1933).
316. West Virginia Steel Corp. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 851 (1960).
317. See, e.g., Connally Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1936); Black
Hardware Co. v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 460 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 841 (1930);
Difco Laboratories, Inc. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 660 (1948).
318. Stoeltzing v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1959).
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ing that an adaptation to the taxpayer's business is deductible
even though it does not enhance the value or prolong the useful
life of the property. 319
E. Expenditures to Maintain Ordinarily Efficient Operating
Conditions
Cases allowing deduction of expenditures on the grounds that
they are made to maintain the ordinarily efficient operating conditions of property frequently touch all of the bases in explaining
why the expenditures are not capital. Those cases conclude that
the expenditures are not an alteration to structural parts, do not
prolong the useful life, are not part of a general remodeling, do not
convert the property to some new use or add a new element of a
structural nature, and do not increase the value of the property. 320
Once such decisions exhaust the reasons that an expenditure is not
capital, most conclude that it is deductible because incurred in the
maintenance of ordinarily efficient operating condition. The reported cases undoubtedly present a distorted picture in that the
deductibility of the typical recurring maintenance expenditure,
such as lubrication of machinery, painting of property, etc., is seldom litigated. 321 On the other hand, in many cases, the taxpayer
has asserted that expenditures were to maintain ordinarily efficient
operating condition, but the courts have disagreed, concluding that
the expenditure was not made to keep the property in ordinarily
efficient condition, but instead to put it into ordinarily efficient
condition. 322 Accordingly, capitalization was required of expenditures to rebuild a building that had not been repaired for so many
years that it had become virtually unusable. 323 Capitalization is the
typical result where the property has passed beyond efficient operating condition and the expenditures are necessary to restore it
319. See, e.g., Difco Laboratories, Inc. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 660, 669 (1948).
320. See, e.g., Collingwood v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 937 (1953); Gilles Frozen Custard,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. 350 (1970).
321. For a rare exception, see Ticket Office Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 272,
279 (1953), aff'd per curiam, 213 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1954).
322. See, e.g., Stoeltzing v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1959); Bloomfield S.S.
Co. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 75 (1959), aff'd per curiam, 285 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1961);
Churchill Farms, Inc. v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. 1071 (1969).
323. Stoeltzing v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 374, 377 (3d Cir. 1959).
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rather than to keep it in good operating condition.324 Such a conclusion is not universal; and in some instances where property apparently has been permitted to run down, restoration expenditures
have nevertheless been held deductible.3211 These authorities ignore
the proper reasoning that where property has fallen into disrepair,
substantial expenditures to restore it to its original condition must
be capitalized because they are in effect incurred in the acquisition
of property suitable to the taxpayer's business. 326 While the putkeep dichotomy falls into place in the entire area of business expense versus capital expenditures, the primary difficulty is that the
courts do not universally apply it.327

F. Replacement of Recurring Minor Items
Expenditures for replacement of minor items that do not appreciably prolong the life of property nor result in an increase in its
value, but only arrest deterioriation by replacing similar minor
items (which through the wear and tear of normal usage have become no longer economically feasible or useful) are currently deductible. 328 Other authorities have looked at the temporary nature
of expenditures and found them deductible when they are of a recurring nature, such as painting or filling cracks.329 As the Board of
Tax Appeals pointed out in Libby & Blouin, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 330 replacing small parts, which in this instance were shortlived and had to be replaced every two or three years, constitutes a
deductible expense.
When a building is erected the flooring, nails and other small supplies of course enter into the capital cost of the building, yet when a
building is repaired, the cost of replacing planks in the floor, and the
cost of nails in making repairs, while it might be a considerable
324. Jones v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 563 (1955), aff'd, 242 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1957).
325. See, e.g., Farmers Creamery Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 879 (1950).
326. Bloomfield_S.S. Co. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 75 (1959), aff'd per curiam, 285 F.2d
431 (6th Cir. 1961). See Stoeltzing v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1959).
327. See, e.g., Farmers Creamery Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 879 (1950).
328. Gaddis v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 741 (S.D. Miss. 1971). See J.F. Wilcox & Sons
v. Commissioner, 28 B.T.A. 878 (1933).
329. Ticket Office Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 272 (1953), aff'd per curiam,
213 F.2d 318 (2d Cir. 1954).
330. 4 B.T.A. 9W (1926).
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item, is entirely different from the ordinary cost of such things when
the building is being erected. As in the case of the locomotive involved in this appeal, expenditures to replace certain worn out parts,
as worn out tubes, broken parts, wheels, etc., merely keep the machine in operating condition.331

G. Overall Pattern of Rehabilitation
As early as 1930, the Board of Tax Appeals in I. M. Cowell v.
Commissioner, 332 adopted the principle that the costs of otherwise
deductible repairs must be capitalized when they constitute a part
of an entire group of items making up a general improvement and
reconditioning of property. In some of the early cases, the courts
appear to have taken this position largely on the basis that it was
impractical to separate the capital items from the ordinary repairs. 333 In Cowell the Board stated:
While the characterization of some of the items is such that standing alone or made as periodic repairs they might be deductible as
ordb;1ary and necessary expenses, it is impractical from the evidence
to ·make such a detailed classification of the items. Such a classification is not a mere matter of what an item is called, but whether it is
a part of the entire capital investment in the improved property. To
fix a door or patch plaster might very well be treated as an expense
when it is an incidental minor item arising in the use of the property
in carrying on business, and yet, as here, be properly capitalized
when involved in a greater plan of rehabilitation, enlargement and
improvement of the entire property.3 :u

The majority of early cases, however, did not rely upon a difficulty in separating capital from ordinary expenditures, but rather
held (without further reasoning) that where all of the expenditures
were pursuant to a general plan of reconditioning and improving
and altering the property as a whole, none of the expenditures was
deductible. 335 Other cases, while adopting a general plan of recon331. !d. at 914.
332. 18 B.T.A. 997 (1930).
333. See, e.g., Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc. v. Commissioner, 24 B.T.A. 599, 619 (1931),
rev'd on other grounds, 64 F.2d 424 (4th Cir. 1933).
334. 18 B.T.A. at 1002 (1930).
335. Home News Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 1008 (1930); accord, First
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ditioning analysis, have still held that the expenditures in question
were material replacements or added to the value of the property
and, hence, were capital.336
The leading plan of rehabilitation case, United States v.
Wehrli, 337 analyzed the general plan of rehabilitation as a part of a
continuing quest by courts in the repair-replacement area for a
"formularization," i.e., an automatic category that results in a certain answer:
In the continuing quest for formularization, the courts have superimposed upon the criteria in the repair regulation an overriding precept that an expenditure made for an item which is part of a "general plan" of rehabilitation, modernization, and improvement of the
property, must be capitalized, even though, standing alone, the item
may appropriately be classified as one of repair. . . . Whether the
plan exists, and whether a particular item is part of it, are usually
questions of fact to be determined by the fact finder based upon a
realistic appraisal of all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including, but not limited to, the purpose, nature, extent, and value of
the work done, e.g., whether the work was done to suit the needs of
an incoming tenant, or to adapt the property to a different use, or,
in any event, whether what was done resulted in an appreciable enhancement of the property's value.338

Although commentators have criticized the "general rehabilitation" rule as it is articulated in the above authorities,339 it appears
well entrenched in the case law. 340

American Nat'! Bank of Nashville v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 675 (M.D. Tenn. 1971),
aff'd, 467 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1972).
336. See, e.g., Cox v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1287, 1293 (1952).
337. 400 F.2d 686 (lOth Cir. 1968); accord, Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. United States,
449 F.2d 816 (lOth Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972).
338. 400 F.2d at 689-90.
339. See, e.g., Gunn, supra note 5; Shugarman, Basic Criteria for Distinguishing Revenue
Charges from Capital Expenditures in Income Ta:c Computations, 49 MicH. L. REV. 213
(1950).
340. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 816 (lOth Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972); Griffin & Co. v. United States, 389 F.2d 802 (Ct. Cl. 1968); First
American Nat'! Bank of Nashville v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 675 (M.D. Tenn. 1971),
aff'd, 467 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1972).
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Moreover, several authorities support the general plan of rehabilitation rule by reasoning that is wholly consistent with other areas
of the capital expense-ordinary deduction dichotomy. In California
Casket Co. v. Commissioner, 341 the taxpayer acquired a building
with the "express intention and purpose of completely renovating
and altering it to conform to the specific requirements of [his] business. " 342 Viewed in this perspective, the plan of rehabilitation
clearly constituted a plan for acquisition of a new capital asset. In
such a case, an expenditure which is part of the acquisition costs
must be capitalized even though it would be deductible standing
alone or incurred after the process of acquisition is complete.343
For example, cleaning is generally an ordinary expense; however, if
the cleaning is the final touch in the turnkey construction of a
building, it constitutes a capital expenditure.344 This rationale underlying the plan of general rehabilitation rule was explicitly recognized by the Tax Court in Jones v. Commissioner. 345
The expenditures involved . . . were not made for "incidental repairs" but were part of an overall plan for the general rehabilitation,
restoration, and improvement of an old building which had lost its
commercial usefulness due to extreme deterioration. . . . The useful
life of the building had ended and its value had almost disappeared
when the process of restoration started. The expenditures materially
added to its value and gave the building a new useful life as a rental
property. . . . The purpose and effect of the expenditures . . . were
341. 19 T.C. 32 (1952).
342. ld. at 37.
343. The taxpayer in California Casket Co. sought to deduct as a repair the cost of restoration of foundation pilings as separate and apart from the overall plan of rehabilitation,
citing two cases where such an expenditure received repair treatment, viz., Midland Empire
Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 635 (1950) and American Bemberg Corp. v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 361 (1948). The court distinguished the two cases, stating:
Both cases involved expenses incurred by taxpayers to permit them the continued
normal operation of plants which had been used and occupied by them for some
years. In neither case was the expenditure involved made to prepare initially a structure for the operation of a particular business. Nor was there present any intention to
make such structure suitable for new or additional uses. The present case is different.
Contrary to the above, the petitioner, in the instant proceeding, acquired the building
in question with the express intention and purpose of completely renovating and altering it to conform to the specific requirements of the petitioner's business.
19 T.C. at 37.
344. Shainberg v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 241, 251 (1959).
345. 24 T.C. 563 (1955), atf'd, 242 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1957).
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not ordinary maintenance expenses and cannot be separated from
the general plan and purpose. They probably contributed as much
as, or more than, the conceded capital expenditures to the increased
value and new useful life of the building. . . . [A]ll should be capitalized and recovered during the new useful life of the building
through deductions for depreciation, which will offset the rental income made possible by the restoration. 346

H. Distortion of Income

The criteria discussed for separating repairs from improvements
are not in conflict although some are difficult to reconcile with general rules regarding capitalization. For example, almost every replacement, even of a minor item, has a useful life extending quite
beyond the current tax year.347 Similarly, most repair expenditures
increase the value of property for the taxpayer's business or as a
matter of business judgment he would not make the expenditures. 348 The greater difficulty is that these criteria cannot be used
to predict with any accuracy the outcome of a particular repairimprovement controversy in most instances. The cases simply are
not reconcilable. 349
A commentator has suggested that the proper criterion is
whether an expenditure for a "repair" is sufficiently substantial in
relationship to the taxpayer's entire business so that to deduct it
would produce a distortion of his income.3150 If so, it must be capitalized; if not, it may be currently deducted. This approach is not
without judicial and other support.3151 For example, regulations
346. 24 T.C. at 568.
347. United States v. Wehrli, 400 F.2d 686, 687 (lOth Cir. 1968).
348. See Stoeltzing v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 374 (3d Cir. 1959).
349. Compare Oberman Mfg. Co. v. Commisaioner, 47 T.C. 471, 481 (1967), acq. 1967-2
C.B. 3 with Mountain State Steel Foundriea, Inc. v. Commisaioner, 18 T.C.M. 306 (1950),
rev'd on other grounds, 284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1960) and Southweat Ornamental Iron Co. v.
Commisaioner, 12 T.C.M. 521 (1953).
350. Gunn, supra note 5 at 457-61.
351. The concern for matching income with expense items is illustrated in Wolfsen Land
& Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1 (1979). There the taxpayer sought to depreciate the
cost of an irrigation system acquired with a ranch, and to capitalize and depreciate the
maintenance required every 10 years. The court held that the cost of the system could not
be depreciated because its useful life could not be determined; however, the court had a
much more difficult time with the maintenance costs. The irrigation ditchea required "draglining" every 10 years to remove silt and plants which would impair the system's hydraulic
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provide that farmers may deduct the cost of small tools 3152 and that
professionals may deduct the cost of books, furniture, professional
instruments and equipment which have a short useful life, albeit in
excess of a year. 3153 In these instances, although the assets have a
useful life beyond the tax year and hence under traditional definition constitute capital assets, allowing a current deduction would
not distort the taxpayer's income. Indeed, the Tax Court in
Sharon v. Commissioner, 8154 stated that where the amount of an
expenditure is small, the taxpayer would ordinarly be allowed to
elect to deduct the full amount of the fee in the year of payment,
despite its capital nature. The Court of Claims in Cincinnati, New
Orleans & Texas Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 31515 expressly concluded that the capital expenditure and depreciation sections of
the Internal Revenue Code were not superior to the method of accounting section of the Code. The fact that an asset has a benefit
extending beyond the current tax year is not conclusive; rather, the
capitalization and depreciation provisions and the method of accounting provisions are so "inextricably intertwined"3156 that they
capacity. It was emphasized that the work did not alter the system or expand its capacity,
but only restored it to its original condition. However, the cost of "draglining" the ditches
was substantial, about the same as the cost of digging a new ditch. The court agonized over
what it termed a "conundrum":
To permit a current deduction of such a large expenditure with a beneficial effect
lasting on the average of 10 years would surely distort that year's income. Yet to deny
even an amortization deduction for an expenditure with a specific demonstrable beneficial life on the grounds that its deductibility is contaminated by its relationship to
an asset of indefinite life, i.e., the land, would similarly require an uneven reporting of
income.
Since a basic premise of the income tax laws is to relate expenses to the income
which they helped earn, a reasonable solution to our conundrum is to hold that the
expenses in issue should be written off over their useful life. In short we would subscribe independent status to those expenditures on the basis that they create a freestanding intangible asset with an amortizable 10-year life.
Id. at 13.
352. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-12.
353. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-6.
354. 66 T.C. 515 (1976), aff'd per curiam, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 941 (1979). The expenditure in question was a $25 license fee paid to practice law in
New York State. The court drew an analogy to the purchase of inexpensive tools, as permitted under § 1.162-12(a). But see Snell v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. 599 (1979) (taxpayer
required to amortize the cost of becoming a member of Lloyds of London over his lifetime;
cost was several thousand dollars).
355. 424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
356. ld. at 569.
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must be utilized in conjunction in deciding the ultimate question
whether the taxpayer's method of deducting expenditures clearly
reflects income. The Court of Claims allowed the taxpayer to currently deduct items which cost less than $500 even though they
had a useful life in excess of one year.
Application of the distortion of income approach by itself would
also produce problems since it must be applied on a case by case
basis.
One taxpayer might be justified in capitalizing an expenditure for a
mattress or a rug, whereas another, operating on a larger scale and
with substantially identical recurring expenditures, might be justified in deducting the expenditure as an expense, if it consistently
followed such a system of accounting and reporting its income.8157

Despite case law support for this approach,8158 it is unlikely to be
universally adopted by the courts due to the plethora of cases applying the traditional repair-replacement criteria. Moreover, its
wide scale judicial application undoubtedly would entail considerable litigation itself in establishing the parameters for when deduction of an item would materially distort the taxpayer's income.
Fortunately, however, the Asset Depreciation Range depreciation provisions3159 in effect make available a distortion of income
approach and formularization approach, which should reduce or
even eliminate the controversy as to expenditures for repairs versus replacements. If a taxpayer elects the ADR System for the tax
year, he may elect a Percentage Repair Allowance (PRA) rule. 380
The PRA rule was designed to reduce the repair-capital expenditure question381 and by mechanical computation to provide for current deductions of all expenditures for repair, maintenance, rehabilitation or improvement of "repair allowance property" within a
class which are not clearly capital expenditures, i.e., "excluded
357. Manger Hotel Corp., 10 T.C. 520, 522 (1948), quoted in 424 F.2d at 569.
358. Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515 (1976), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 2883 (1979); Cincinnati New Orleans & Pac. R.R. v. United States,
424 F.2d 563 (Ct. CI. 1970).
359. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(a)(1).
360. Id. § 1.167-ll(d)(2)(ii).
361. Id. § 1.167-ll(d)(2)(i)(a).
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additions" to the extent that they do not exceed a repair
allowance. 362
VII.

CoNCLUSION

In deciding whether to recover its costs by capitalization or current deduction, a business need only read the rules under sections
162 and 263 to make a simple determination. The rules, obvious on
first reading, have led taxpayers, the Service and the courts down a
path into a bramble patch of conflicting theories and unpredictable
results.
The courts have used a variety of theories to explain section 263
and to standardize its application. An undercurrent in all these
theories is an attempt by the courts to prevent distortion of income. Although not articulated by most courts, reliance on the distortion of income rationale is a useful method to reconcile otherwise contradictory court decisions.
In the creation or enhancement of an asset approach, for example, the Tenth Circuit in Colorado Springs National Bank, 363 in
allowing deduction of start-up costs, feared that the government's
approach "[would permit] a distortion of taxpayer's financial situation. " 364 In attempting to reconcile cases in which the same type of
expense is treated in one case as standing by itself and in another
case as part of the creation of a new asset, the cases can be analyzed more readily by focusing on whether a current deducton for
the particular taxpayer leads to a distortion of income.
Another theory used by the courts to determine the proper tax
treatment of an item is the origin of the claim doctrine. The doctrine generally holds that expenditures which are integrally related
to an income or loss item or transaction must possess the same
character for tax purposes as that initial item or transaction, although different tax years are involved. Expenditures which stem
from a capital transaction are required to be "matched" or equated

362. Id. § 1.167-11(d)(2)(iii)(a). See generally
ADR SYSTEM 73 (1975).

THE CLASS LIFE

363. 505 F.2d 1185 (lOth Cir. 1974).
364. Id. at 1192.
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with gains from the same transaction. This relation back is also
necessary to prevent a distortion of taxpayer's income.
The origin of the claim doctrine has also been used in looking
forward in time from an expense. For example, courts have used
the doctrine to justify allowing a current deduction for advertising
and promotional expenses because the expenses will generate ordinary income in the future. Using origin of the claim, courts have
required capitalization of costs associated with the issuance of
stock, recapitalizations, and redemptions as well as costs incurred
subsequent to such capital transactions. More realistically, to have
permitted current deduction of such expenditures would have materially distorted the true operating income of an entity since the
transactions do not produce recognized gains.
The third formal doctrine discussed was the tax benefit rule.
This rule is closely linked to and often used in conjunction with
the origin of the claim doctrine. Implicit in the tax benefit rule is
the realization that although the annual accounting concept requires each tax year to stand alone, items occurring in different
years may be so integrally related that not to treat them similarly
would distort taxpayer's income. The tax benefit rule can help reconcile seemingly conflicting decisions related to expenditures incurred in incorporating businesses, changing corporate capital
structures, and liquidating corporations.
If the question of capitalization of organizational expenditures,

reorganizational expenditures, expenditures in connection with the
issuance of corporate stock and with the redemption or transfers of
stock were all approached from the tax benefit viewpoint of avoiding distortion of income, many of the complexities in this area disappear. In all of these transactions, the corporation recognizes no
gain; accordingly, to allow it a deduction would produce a distortion of its income.
The important connection among the origin of the claim doctrine, the Arrowsmith tax benefit rule, and the classic tax benefit
doctrine is that two transactions are linked in order to prevent a
distortion of taxpayer's income.
The classic shoals for judicially drawn distinctions between sections 162 and 263 occur in the repair/replacement dichotomy. The
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criteria established by the courts in this area cannot be used to
predict with any accuracy the outcome of a particular repair/replacement controversy. Similar expenses by different taxpayers are
treated differently by the courts. To reconcile these cases, the
proper criterion should be whether an expenditure for a "repair" is
sufficiently substantial in relation to a taxpayer's entire business
that to deduct it would distort taxpayer's income. If a distortion
would occur, the "repair" expense must be capitalized; if not, it
may be expensed.
Predictability in tax matters is important. Definite, set rules enhance predictability. However, distortion of the income of a particular taxpayer should take precedence over predictability in the
section 263 area.
As Justice Cardozo said,
[W]hat is ordinary, though there must always be a strain of constancy within it, is nonetheless affected by time and place and circumstance. . . . One struggles in vain for any verbal formula that
will supply a ready touchstone. The standard set up by the statute is
not a rule of law; it is rather a rule of life. Life in all its fullness
must supply the answer to the riddle. . . . To attempt to harmonize
[the phases of the problem] would be a futile task.865

365. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113-16 (1933).

